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Households can be taken for granted in the West because the nuclear family 
system with its bilateral descent ensures a fairly standard pattern of co-
residence, with predictable patterns of pooling resources. In contemporary 
southern Africa, the tradition of patrilineal descent entails a much wider set of 
options for co-residence as relatives disperse to make a living in the new global 
economy. The agnatic idiom continues to give coherence to volatile contingent 
Black households. The paper traces the distinctive historical roots of Western 
and African households and argues against the assumption that black South 





It is a relatively simple matter nowadays to gain access to a large database 
containing diverse and interesting pieces of information about contemporary 
black households in South Africa. In the last decade, official statistics have 
finally remedied the indifference of the past century to black standards of living, 
earning, spending and congestion. Black incomes, houses, facilities, educational 
levels and occupations are now subject to the same ongoing state scrutiny to 
which white, coloured and Indian householders have grown accustomed to over 
the years. However, this data presents a new problem for social scientists, 
namely, how to correctly interpret facts and figures collected from black people 
on the basis of household. Does sharing a dwelling carry the same implications 
for black people as it does for those of northern European descent, who devised 
the household survey strategy, and used it effectively for decades to gather 
intelligence amongst their own kind? Such surveys rest upon assumptions about 
the coherence and stability and exclusiveness of co-residential groups which, far 
from being universal, hold good only under limited cultural and economic 
conditions. That these conditions prevailed for so long in the West, lulled many 
researchers in southern Africa into assuming households to be an unproblematic 
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universal phenomena – differing in size and composition in different societies, 
but sharing the common characteristic of being, in each instance the basic kin 
group with shared responsibility for one another’s day-to-day well-being. That 
complacency is however now passing.  Household, kinship and sexual 
partnerships in southern Africa are receiving the attention long urged by social 
anthropologists, stimulated in part by new funding available as a spin-off of the 
AIDS pandemic.  
 
Censuses conducted world-wide on the basis of such co-residential households 
have returned robust data1 on such things as age, sex, race, nationality, fertility, 
occupation, possessions and income. But once such data are aggregated by 
shared address and/or shared meals, once those sharing are labelled a household, 
once we start producing tables classifying these households by size, age and sex 
structure, family type, income, health or wealth, and then start devising social 
policies on this basis, we are in grievous danger of attributing to co-residential 
groups inappropriate characteristics – like persistence and internal cohesion – 
derived from alien Western social practice. The problem was well recognised 
twenty years ago by participants in a workshop on the African household,2 at 
which ‘some participants rejected the usefulness of the concept of household 
altogether’ (Vaughan 1985: 35).  Vaughan  instead emphasises the value of that 
discussion for discrediting models of African household which assume common 
ownership, joint decision-making, firm boundaries, commensality, ‘the conjugal 
estate’, fixed cultural forms, or a predictable evolutionary trajectory. She 
highlights the importance of grasping ‘problematically invisible’ inter-
household relations (Vaughan, 1985:6) as African economies are 
commercialized; ‘for without a knowledge of these it appears unlikely that we 
will understand the structure of households’ (ibid.), and warns against 
overlooking the particular historical conditions experienced by different African 
communities.  Harris (1981:51) had warned against extending the image of the 
household as ‘a separate private sphere… so powerful in contemporary capitalist 
organization… to cover other radically different structures, using our own 
categories of thought to interpret different realities’. Nene (1988:2,5), addressing 
sociologists in South Africa, is adamant that black urban domestic units ‘defy 
traditional definitions’ and urges that we ‘avoid the temptation of readily 
transferring research paradigms that are founded on foreign conceptualisations’.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Provided they adequately manage the chronic problems of under-counting and double-
counting mobile members. 
2 Conceptualising the Household in Africa: Issues of Theory, Method and Application. 




Over the past twenty years, dedicated international scholarship has been 
invested in the notion of household, but generalisations seem as elusive as ever. 
Attempts to establish a valid cross-cultural definition proved so difficult that 
Wilk and Netting (1984), introducing a collection of papers from a distinguished 
international panel of historians and social anthropologists gathered specifically 
to consider households in 1981, effectively side-step the issue of definition. 
Instead they concentrate on the five activities – production, distribution, 
transmission, reproduction and co-residence – that we ‘know’ are ‘most often’ 
performed by ‘the small, numerous, corporate social units observers generally 
agree in calling households’. Whereas before it had been assumed that ‘kinship 
relations were logically prior to households’, determining the rules of residence, 
it was now recognised that household organisation lay at least partly outside the 
realm of kinship analysis. A broader approach was required. Working through 
each of these five activities, ‘commonly performed’ by these ‘corporate social 
units observers generally agree in calling households’, Wilk and Netting 
generate at least a dozen stimulating hypotheses about the way activity impacts 
on morphology i.e. household composition. They propose that since 
‘morphology is a compromise between often contradictory functional 
imperatives’, there is a ‘constant tension’ driving adaptability and change in 
household structure through time (Ibid: 20).  
 
They detect an ‘evolutionary path’ in the patterning of the activities dominating 
household form, with modern households, like hunter-gatherer households, 
shaped mainly by only two of the five activities: reproduction and distribution3 
They suggest ‘modernisation’ be seen not as a transition from one form of 
household to another, but as ‘a change in the activity spheres that underlie 
household form’, usually characterised by loss of productive activities. They 
insist that household morphology cannot be predicted (Ibid). 
 
‘without the specifics of each case and without knowledge of the 
cultural context of rules and norms by which household form and 
function are mediated and reconciled…The material flows of 
labour, goods, and cash in household production, distribution and 
transmission are negotiated anew in each generation according to 
the historical circumstances of the moment but always with respect 
to culturally approved option of co-residence, patterns of authority’ 
(Wilk & Netting, 1984: 21).  
 
                                                          
3 The omission of residence is surprising, unexplained. 
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Household is at the centre of a different theoretical approach developed by 
Wallerstein, Smith and colleagues in their analysis of the incorporation of the 
third world (in their terms the periphery) into the world economy. They suggest 
that the term household be reserved for domestic groups that are formed after 
incorporation into the world economic system. Household is a social form 
created by insertion into the capitalist world system, in order to link individuals 
to the global economy. It is a social arrangement for managing domestic life 
wherever access to cash (often, but by no means always, through wage 
employment) becomes a central goal. It is the appropriate unit for analysing the 
ways that people fit into the labour force. Household  is defined as  
 
‘the social unit that effectively over long periods of time enables 
individuals, of varying ages and both sexes, to pool income coming 
from multiple sources in order to ensure their individual and 
collective reproduction and well-being’ (Wallerstein & Smith, 
1992: 13).  
 
This is not how the corporate social unit observers generally agree on the 
meaning of household, for neither kinship nor co-residence are defining 
characteristics. Householding is a strategy for resource allocation. They 
distinguish households from earlier more communal pre-capitalist pre-industrial 
productive domestic groups, which evolved under different circumstances, such 
as the patrilineal homestead communities which still survive in southern Africa, 
though with a reduced economic role. 
 
Working with the same conceptual schema, Martin and Beittel (1987:221-222) 
describe the emergence of the households in Africa as ‘a radical transformation’ 
which occurred as pre-capitalist controls over agricultural production and labour 
were ‘dissolved’. The domestic group was ‘re-orientated’ to ‘uses commensurate 
with the economic activities of the peripheral zone of the world economy’. The 
‘structural integument of the pre-colonial economy failed to survive’. Chiefs and 
male elders lost control to younger males and household heads. They describe 
the ‘fitful emergence’ of a smaller group, a smaller set of social relationships 
which we call the ‘household’, from pre-capitalist structures responsible for 
producing the labour force (ibid). New networks had to be constructed for 
survival in the new world economy. 
 
Like Hackenberg, Murphy and Selby (1984), they argue that households on the 
periphery will differ systematically from households at the capitalist core. 
Although ‘grounded in space’, core and periphery are not regions; for ‘there are 
multiple layers of coreness and peripherality’ and ‘peripherality exists only in 
relation to and by contrast with coreness’ (Wallerstein & Smith, 1992b: 255). 
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‘We can of course also find core-periphery relations within a single country’ 
(ibid.). Their example is South Africa. 
 
Wallerstein and Smith’s analysis  proceeds by way of considering sources of 
household income. The five possible categories of income are from wages, sales, 
rent, transfers and subsistence. They argue that almost all households, in both 
periphery and core, over time, get some of their income from each source. 
However the proportions of income from each source vary systematically with 
the household’s location in the economy, whether at the core or at the periphery. 
Households in the core are likely to rely much more heavily on wages, and 
wages are more likely to be adequate to meet their needs. When these are 
inadequate they are likely to be supplemented by transfers from the state (so-
called ‘benefits’). Households in the periphery are, by definition, never wholly 
wage-dependent. That is their defining characteristic. The periphery is never 
truly proletarian. Any wages earned are always insufficient to meet needs, and 
are supplemented – not with subsistence from peasant production as the 
traditional view of historical social change implies, but – with petty market 
operations. Such peripheral households are constantly ‘in desperate need of 
cash’ because the process of peripheralisation undermines the viability of 
traditional subsistence activities (Wallerstein & Smith, 1992b:256). They 
consequently make a living by selling or renting anything, from food and drinks 
to shacks, drugs and sexual favours. The combination, within a household, of 
wages and petty marketing is ‘the very mark of peripheralisation’ (ibid). 
 
Contrary to earlier assumptions of development, these semi-proletarian 
households on the periphery are destined never to become fully proletarianised. 
Only at the core will a minority of households ever earn enough from selling 
their labour to live exclusively by this means. The fact that peripheral 
households make use of an array of income source has predictable 
consequences. In times of economic recession, such households will expand for 
in order to diversify their sources of income, they need to draw in more 
members. By contrast, in times of economic expansion they will contract. A 
similar correlation, between deprivation and the extension of families, had been 
observed in industrialising England (Medick 1976). From an employer’s 
perspective, people from semi-proletarian households are a more desirable 
source of labour than fully proletarian households because, being less wage-
dependent, they will accept lower wages. In times of world economic stagnation, 
industry relocates to zones where such households are to be found. Wallerstein 
and Smith conclude, ‘The most interesting outcome of our research is the 
evidence that there seems to be a type of household structure that binds people 
to core-like activities…and another that seems to bind people to peripheral 
activities’ (Wallerstein & Smith 1992b: 255).  
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Wallerstein and colleague’s notions of households are useful to think about. 
They jolt us out of any complacent search for enduring African household 
structures, though they remind us that distinctive past practices will persist to 
shape the new domestic structures. They keep us alert to the power of capitalism 
to alter economic opportunities, and to limit survival strategies in even remote 
places. But they attach almost no importance whatsoever to co-residence. In a 
rapidly changing economy, people will move as they must, and sleep where they 
can, holding in their heads their sets of lifetime obligations, rights and 
responsibilities, relying and drawing on them as best they can. These enduring 
linkages - so hard to pin down, count or quantify - constitute the real domestic 
structure of peripheral societies. How do we then interpret contemporary data 
gathered from black people on the basis of co-residence? The problem has some 
practical urgency, since survey practice, shaped by Western assumptions, is 
likely (on purely expedient grounds) to remain wedded to samples gathered on 
the basis of residence. 
 
 
The Importance of Kinship Systems for 
Household Structure 
 
My interest in households arises from intense frustration experienced both in 
personal attempts to conduct household surveys in Africa and in assessing the 
outcomes of such surveys which others have conducted (Russell, 1984, 1993, 
1994, 1998, 2002). The problem revolves around trying to determine the 
boundaries of a household, for by the inclusion or exclusion of certain people – 
for example a well-paid worker – we dramatically change the household profile 
– for example from rich to poor, from female-headed to male-headed. As the 
literature makes clear, the problem is by no means unique to southern Africa. 
The inadequacy of household survey methodology to capture reality in Latin 
America has been well documented (Wilk & Miller,  1997). It arises in an acute 
form wherever migrant labour separates earners from their dependants. It is 
exacerbated when, as in South Africa’s past, the free movement of people, to 
live where and with whom they choose, is restricted by what Manona 
(1991:204) calls (rather kindly) ‘the active agency of the state bureaucracy’. But 
it reaches more deeply than that, for the characteristics of the Western co-
residential household (upon which household survey methodology was 
modelled) have been an integral part and consequence of its atypical conjugal 
kinship system. Where other kinship systems prevail, where other ways of 
identifying and classifying who is and is not a kinsman prevail, with 
consequently different rules about obligations for support, sharing and nurture, 
co-residence can carry quite different implications. If in the seventies it was 
realised that household organisation lay at least partly outside the realm of 
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kinship analysis, in the nineties in southern Africa one needed reminding that 
household organisation lay partly inside the realm of kinship analysis. Southern 
African kinship systems must be understood if we are to understand how 
contemporary southern African householding works. 
 
This paper therefore starts by drawing attention to the importance of kinship, 
that whole edifice of socially significant biological, genealogical and conjugal 
ties which every society constructs to order daily life, in the patterning of 
economic interdependence and patterns of co-residence. Black and white South 
Africans are brought up with two radically different kinship idioms. One is 
derived from the conjugal system which has predominated in north western 
Europe for at least 500 years; the other is the consanguinal descent system 
characteristic of most of Africa. Each has been the subject of intense scholarship  
and debate. Each has exerted a strong influence on patterns of co-residence. We 
cannot understand contemporary South African households without first 
understanding the notions of kinship which underpin dependencies and 
responsibilities. 
 
At the heart of the prevailing family tradition amongst white people is the 
conjugal couple, who are strongly expected to set up their own independent 
household in which they alone will rear their own dependent children to 
maturity. The African tradition, which so fascinated early twentieth century 
European ethnographers, is very different. Descent rather than marriage is the 
central principle; in southern Africa, patrilineal or agnatic descent, i.e. descent 
from father. Kinship imagery pervades African discourse. Mehlwana (1996:83) 
writes, ‘People give meaning to their relationships through describing them in 
kinship terms…describing significant relationships through the kinship idiom 
wherever they can’. In Africa, you confer significance on friendship by 
depicting it as kinship. In the West, to the contrary, people confer significance 
on kinship by depicting it as friendship: ‘She is more of a friend to me than a 
mother’. 
  
A similar emphasis on kinship system is central to Macfarlane’s (1978, 1986) 
work on households in times past in England, and to Hammel’s work on Serbia, 
where the principles of kinship – lineage organisation, patrilocality4 and agnatic 
bias5 – have remained ‘remarkably constant’ over several centuries (Hammel, 
1995: 337). In southern Africa, too, principles of kinship are more persistent and 
influential than is usually allowed. By highlighting these principles, and in 
particular by drawing attention to differences between the principles underlying 
                                                          
4 Patrilocality: the rule of post marital residence whereby a wife lives with her husband who 
has remained with his own father; 
5 Agnatic bias: the tendency for social organisation to arrange itself according to groupings of 
persons related only through males. 
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black and white kinship constructions, we make greater sense of accumulating 
data on black households, which can be very misleading when it is gathered 
from people for whom co-residence lacks the expected social and economic 
implications of the West, whatever the apparent similarities in composition of 
the co-residing group. My approach to kinship is necessarily limited to that of a 




Political Sensitivities and Cultural Differences 
 
The apartheid project greatly complicated the way culture differences are now 
approached in South Africa. There lingers on amongst liberal white people a 
great hesitancy to suggest that there are significant cultural differences between 
different racial groups. Indeed, so great is this hesitancy that the concept of 
separate cultures and sub-cultures have themselves become taboo in local social 
science circles as unnecessarily divisive. The fashionable emphasis is on what 
people share, and how unequally shares are distributed. Any lingering regard for 
race-based culture difference is viewed with deep suspicion as the slippery slope 
back to apartheid. Thus Ross (1993, 1995, 1996) in her memorable account of 
domestic life in Die Bos coyly fails to tell us that some of her informants are 
coloured, some black. In suppressing racial identity, she deprives us of insight 
into the way race became irrelevant for this community. Two other recent 
studies of family and household devalue themselves by a fastidious aversion to 
identifying their subjects by race. Skordis and Welch (2002) miss a valuable 
opportunity to inform us about black urban households by including, without 
differentiation, an unknown number of probably differently structured coloured 
households in their sample, on the grounds that they all live on the Cape Flats. 
Tellingly, neighbourhood (still a proxy for race in most parts of contemporary 
South Africa) emerges as the most significant predictor of household members’ 
knowledge of one another’s incomes – but only those readers with an intimate 
knowledge of Cape Town’s topography will understand this. 
 
A similar criticism must be levelled at Rabe’s (2001) study of marital 
separation. Her sample of twelve couples who live apart presumably contains 
black and white people, but it requires some detective work on the part of the 
reader to establish this, for race is the one factor never mentioned: Would a 
white man live in a dormitory?  Would a black woman live in one of the 
                                                          
6 But see Ziehl (2002: 32-33) for an amusing but misplaced attack on me as a ‘territorial’ 
anthropologist. 
7 As for example Kuper (1982) who depicts clans and lineages in southern Africa as fictive 
creations of ethnographers. 
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upmarket suburbs of Johannesburg, employ a domestic servant, drive an 
expensive car take her children out to dinner?  Would a black man shoot and kill 
himself and his wife? Although she tells us ‘the respondents have different first 
languages’ (Rabe, 2001:279) she makes the surely ill-judged assumption that 
culture/race is irrelevant in a study of the conjugal couple. A moment’s thought 
would confirm the profoundly different weight placed on conjugal co-residence 
by black and white people. Romantic-love-based Western marriage prescribes a 
shared conjugal household; a marriage contracted within a polygynous idiom 
against a background of patrilineal extended families long accustomed to 
migrant labour, is subject to very different expectations. Race would have been 
an interesting variable to isolate in a mixed race sample. 
 
This squeamishness is easy to understand. The apartheid project’s assiduous 
cultivation of irreconcilable differences in order to maintain and justify white 
domination, affronted the decent-minded amongst the elite who worked hard to 
subvert the system by sinking their differences and working at assimilation. The 
assimilation was of course to white Western ways: apartheid was decried as 
inhibiting a natural world-wide evolution towards the dominant Western culture. 
This strong association between acknowledgement of culture differences and a 
brutal political programme has been particularly unfortunate for social scientists 
in South Africa since it has deterred them from exploring other deplorable 
economic facts which so conspicuously reinforce many racial differences.  
 
No such inhibitions have hampered the writing of African demographers in their 
attempt to account for Africa’s failure to make the predicted fertility transition.8 
Contemporary African domestic institutions, in all their uniqueness, lie at the 
heart of the riveting papers of Lesthaeghe and colleagues (Lesthaeghe,1989). 
The least inhibited statement of cultural difference comes from the Caldwells 
(Caldwell, 1976; Caldwell & Caldwell, 1990), concerned with the practical 
demographic issue of fertility in Africa. Their work is convincing because it 
rests on at least a hundred published papers by (mainly West) African (i.e. 
indigenous) researchers. Marital and sexual relations are at the centre of their 
concern. They are struck by how little variation there is throughout the 
continent.  
 
The consequences of different ways of reckoning descent for domestic group 
structure have been exhaustively analysed by Goody (1973). His monograph 
convincingly establishes the singularity of the African pattern, with its 
commitment to bride wealth exchange at marriage, as quite distinct in structure 
and consequences from the dowry-based marriage systems found in parts of 
Europe and Asia, with which it is sometimes confused. By shrugging off the 
                                                          
8 From high to low fertility as a response to a falling death rate. 
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persistent notion that South Africa is different from the rest of Africa, by seeing 
South Africa as a more integral part of the continent, we would gain a clearer 
perspective on the way Western penetration has modified black domestic 
institutions in the industrialised south. We need to feel free to recognise what is 
distinctive in the African tradition, and to acknowledge how acute the collision 
of the African kinship with Western expectations has been, and continues to be. 
Congruencies between black and white household structures have too eagerly 
been interpreted as evidence of convergence. 
 
This paper suggests instead that the new domestic strategies adopted by black 
people in South Africa to accommodate changed circumstances are within the 
agnatic idiom, which is proving no less resilient and adaptable than the Western 
conjugal idiom in providing a charter by which most black South Africans 
continue to order their radically altered domestic lives.  
 
In most of Africa, descent-based kinship, rather than being confined to a 
residual, intimate, domestic sphere, has been the basis for the day-to-day 
organisation of production, and for the distribution of authority. This holds for 
societies as different from one another as the mid-twentieth century acephalous 
Nuer of the Sudan and the centrally co-ordinated chiefdoms of the Zulu of South 
Africa in the nineteenth century. Ekeh (1990) attributes the persistent attachment 
to kinship as an organising principle in Africa to the impact of the transatlantic 
slave trade. He argues that as interior raiding intensified, people retreated from 
proto-feudal slaving states into the safer independence of unilineal kin groups. 
Such groups were ‘a reaction formation’ (Ekeh, 1990: 681). Underlying his 
argument lurks another theme, consonant with van den Berghe’s (1978) thesis, 
that there is something regressive, underdeveloped, about kinship as an 
organising principle, which needs to blamed on outsiders, without whose 
aggressive interference Africa might have evolved beyond such considerations 
to some more impersonal and atomistic form of social structure. The paradigms 
of social change devised by social science in the 19th century are all infused with 
this same bias. Progress implies shedding tiresome inherited obligations to kin in 
favour of egocentric individualistic voluntaristic attitudes more suited to 
expanding world capitalism. We detect it in those favoured theoretical 
oppositions between ascription and achievement (Linton, 1938), particularism 
and universalism (Parsons, 1951), gemeinschaft and gesellschaft (Tonnies, 
1957), mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1893). The limited range 
of people reckoned ‘close kin’ in the Western conception has been depicted as 
an intrinsic part of Westerners’ superior rate of progress. Africans have been 
portrayed as held back by outdated notions of responsibility to too wide a range 
of dependants. The argument is the secular counterpart of the sustained Christian 
missionary attack on polygyny, levirate, sororate, ancestral spirits, and other 
institutions of African domestic life. 
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Contemporary black South African ideas about appropriate patterns of co-
residence and family behaviour have been shaped in the tumult of the last 
hundred years. Expectations, derived from the agnatic kinship system evolved 
over centuries as pastoral cultivators, have been confronted by a transformed 
political economy, undercutting the material base on which kinship practices 
were originally constructed. They have also come up against Western 
expectations, powerfully propagated by Christian missionaries acting as the 
gatekeepers of social mobility in the colonial era. New patterns have had to be 
forged within the peculiar constraints of the urban industrial economy as 
constructed in South Africa, with its excessive preoccupation with control of all 
internal migration, of all access to land, housing and formal employment, and its 
simultaneous inability to control the spread of ideas, especially urban American 
ideas of individualism and consumerism as celebrated in popular song and on 
screen. Different observers, each with their own biases, have at different times 
assigned different weights to these influences. Unsurprisingly, observers 
working in rural landholding communities are the most convinced of the 
continuing hold of traditional kinship ideas, for it is amongst these that such 
ideas continue to make most sense, and are most strongly defended.9  
 
The past fifty years have exerted contradictory pressures on black South 
Africans’ perceptions of their past. On the one hand, there has been continuing 
pressure to dissolve old norms and practices, since the land-based economy in 
which they emerged has been eroded by industrial capitalism; on the other hand, 
there have been pressures to deliberately revive past notions, sometimes as a 
device for political mobilisation in reaction to state policies of racial exclusion, 
sometimes as a device encouraged by the apartheid state itself to divide and rule. 
People’s reactions to the very notion of ‘tradition’ have consequently become 
convoluted. Pride in the past is ambivalently tempered with renunciations of the 
conservatism with which ‘tradition’ is necessarily linked, and which apartheid 
rule assiduously cultivated.  
 
‘Tradition’ has been exposed as a powerful tool in Africa which continues to be 
cunningly manipulated to shore up this or that power base whenever the 
possibility presents itself. It is an aspect of that ever-present African mobiliser, 
ethnicity (Vail, 1989). But it is also an important indigenous cultural resource 
for ordinary people with which they impose comforting continuity in the 
interpretation of their everyday lives (Spiegel, 1991). Spiegel and McAllister 
(1991:1) underline the flexibility of tradition to transcend the traumas of social 
transition: ‘traditions…are constantly reworked’. In this sense, tradition cannot 
be a guide to the past, only to the present. But we need an adjective to describe 
                                                          
9 My work experience in Swaziland where popular rights to land are constitutionally 
entrenched has shaped my bias. 
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and isolate those sets of kinship practices which by all accounts are grounded in 
the past. ‘Traditional’ seems as good a word as any other, despite its 
contemporary political resonances in South Africa.  
 
Guyer and Peters (1987:200) remind us that ‘culturally specific rubrics’ still 
shape domestic practices in Africa. Wilk and Netting (1984:21) remind us not to 
forget the ‘cultural context of rules and norms’ determining household form and 
function. Wallerstein and Smith (1992: 13) make room for such a notion in 
identifying ethnicity as one of the five factors (or ‘orienting propositions’) to be 
taken into account in trying to understand household variation in the 
contemporary world economy (The other four are determined by the world 
market and the state). They define ethnicity as ‘a collection of cultural norms, 
perhaps a common language, sometimes a religious affiliation, which marks us 
off from others of the same class and nation’ which people powerfully but 
mistakenly believe to be immutable (Wallerstein & Smith, 1992:19). They 
suggest that households constitute themselves in part by drawing on the pre-
existing, taken-for-granted rules of appropriate behaviour between kinsmen, 
which are more persistent than other cultural elements because they are acquired 
and transmitted as part of early socialisation. These norms refer ‘most 
importantly’ to the operation of the household itself (ibid). 
 
This paper is concerned with drawing attention to these culturally specific 
rubrics. Generalisations for the southern African sub-continent are both foolish 
and hazardous. Schapera’s (1971) work on the Kgatla  and the Kriges’(1943) 
work on the Lovedu  are sufficient to remind us how differently kinship is 
constructed and manipulated amongst the Tswana in comparison to the Nguni, 
from whom most of the material shared here is drawn. The Xhosa, Zulu and 
Swazi comprise about half of the population of South Africa, and over 60 per 
cent of the African population (SAIRR 1994/5: 12). Less displaced from their 
land than other black South Africans to the north, they may have a greater stake 
than others in maintaining fine kin distinctions from the past. Manona 
(1991:204) suggests something like this in attributing ex-farmworkers’ emphasis 
on filiation rather than agnatic descent to their lack of heritable property. 
  
 
Western Households, Western Kinship 
 
Paradoxically, our confusion about culture stems as much from a failure to 
consider the nature of Western kinship and household systems as from any 
ignorance of African systems. The Western household cannot be taken for 
granted as the norm but must be seen as a culturally specific and unique 
institution. Very briefly, the Western assumption is that a household typically 
comprises a family formed by a conjugal couple. It will contain their dependent 
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offspring if they have any, and may include frail aged parents taken in towards 
their life’s end,10 but readily reverts to a couple when offspring attain maturity 
or parents die. To oversimplify, in the West, household and family coincide. 
Because ‘family’ can be read off from co-residential household in the West, we 
tend to assume this holds true everywhere. This assumption underlay Steyn’s 
(1993) research strategy in 1988 when, using a national sample, she took co-
residential household data as evidence of family type, and then shifted, in 
successive publications of her paper, between the two terms as though the 
distinction was of no importance.11 But the two notions are conceptually 
different. Family – a term spurned by social anthropologists for its notorious 
ambiguity – refers nowadays,12 loosely, to those kin considered closest. The 
Oxford dictionary captures the contemporary British usage of the word, giving 
as its ‘core sense’ ‘ a group consisting of two parents and their children living 
together as a unit’, but also several sub-senses including ‘a group of people 
related by blood or marriage’ (Pearsall, 1999: vii, 512). The term ‘household’ 
nowadays shifts our focus from kinship to economic interdependence; having 
said which, we must acknowledge an even greater disagreement. For although 
the ‘house’ in ‘household’ implies that members of a household live together, 
this merely betrays the word’s rootedness in English practice. As we have seen, 
in other places, especially where economic migration is common, kin who are 
economically interdependent in the sense of commitment to consciously 
supporting one another, may live far apart from one another for a great part of 
their lives.  
 
In the West, the people living together tend to be members of a conjugal nuclear 
family in some or other stage of their domestic cycle. They may be childless 
newly-weds. They may be a pair of pensioners whose grown children have set 
up their own independent households. They are somewhere along a predictable 
trajectory, from birth into a simple two-generation conjugal nuclear family 
household, to death as part of the disintegrating remnant of what was once 
another two-generation conjugal family household. The Western family is short-
lived and ‘self-liquidating’ (Goldthorpe, 1987).13 Distinctively, a one-generation 
heterosexual couple is a common household form in the West.  
 
                                                          
10 Kertzer (1995) calls this ‘a nuclear reincorporation household system’ and sets it beside the 
‘pure nuclear family system’ as a ‘variant’.  
11 Steyn’s 1993 publication ‘Urban Family Structures in the Republic of South Africa’ re-
appears in 1995 as ‘Urban Household Structures in the Republic of South Africa’. 
12 See Williams (1988) for the shifting uses of household and family in England over past five 
hundred years. 
13 Goldthorpe (1987) succinctly summarises the unfolding history of the sociology of the 
Western family. 
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The accuracy of this stereotypical Western household, has been somewhat 
undermined by dramatic developments in the past thirty years (Bawin-Leguos 
2001). In Britain, for example, rates of marriage have plunged and the 
proportion of marriages ending in divorce has risen. Some writers observe the 
renewed importance of extended kin as part of this new pattern, particularly 
amongst the working class (Mitchell & Green, 2002). Others are more struck by 
the apparent disintegration of the whole system. A third of births in England and 
Wales are now premarital (Coleman, 2000: 51-64). First pregnancies are 
postponed as women spend more time as wage-earners. Efficient contraception 
ensures that child-bearing is confined to a briefer portion of women’s lives. 
Increasing numbers of people live alone or share households temporarily. 
Reconstituted families are so common that British schools have been instructed 
not to reinforce older notions of domestic propriety and school reading books 
have been adjusted accordingly. Sex and conception are increasingly divorced, 
the former less a private act than a public art form, obsessively discussed, 
displayed, dissected and disseminated daily by the media; the latter is less a 
matter of nature than science and medical technology, with in vitro fertilisation 
now promised as a right to all British women of child-bearing age. A similar 
disintegration of the family has been recorded for places as far east as Siberia 
(Mikheyeva, 1998). 
 
These recent changes have rendered the mid-twentieth century picture of the 
conjugal family, with its cosy gender-based division of labour and authority, less 
convincing as the apposite template for the 21st century. Yet certain features of 
the Western household remain obstinately unchanged. The couple, more than 
ever, is the central element around whom households are formed (Beck &  
Beck-Gernschein, 1995). Westerners may uncouple more frequently, but they 
also re-couple with great readiness, if not heterosexually, then homosexually. 
The absence of the couple amongst black South African households is but one of 
the markers of a very different system: Steyn’s (1993) data suggest that less than 
3 per cent of black households are composed of just a heterosexual couple, 




Bi-Lateral Descent  
 
Parsons (1949) has suggested why the Western household takes this form. In 
this neglected essay (written in 1943) he subjected the kinship system of the 
USA to an anthropological-style analysis. He demonstrated how the bilateral 
mode of reckoning descent14 inevitably produces the familiar taken-for-granted 
series of discrete conjugally-anchored co-residential domestic groups, Western 
households. Hence the difficulty Westerners have of distinguishing family from 
household, and the casualness with which even social science texts slip from the 
one term to the other. It is unfortunate that his essay is now remembered only for 
its ill-judged and now unfashionable insistence on the structural necessity of a 
sexual division of labour.  
 
He argues that because, in the conjugal system, descent is conceived as flowing 
simultaneously and equilaterally from what are colloquially described as ‘both 
sides of the family’ (as shown, for example, in the fact that there are no terms of 
forms of address to distinguish father’s from mother’s kin: all are alike 
grandparents, aunts, uncles or cousins), there can be no ‘solidary’ descent 
groups (Parsons’ clumsy word for the clans, lineages and agnatic clusters found 
in other societies). Uniquely in this system, no two individuals (with the 
exception of immature siblings) share the same array of kin. Instead, every 
individual has his/her own unique constellation of close relatives, ‘ego-centred’, 
acquired first by birth and then by marriage and procreation. The roots of 
Western individualism go very deep. 
 
In this system, the conjugal family household established at marriage is the only 
possible corporate kinship group. The absence of a more inclusive corporate 
kinship group is another marker separating white South African from black 
South African domestic systems. The consequent difficulties and tensions, 
which are endemic in attempted Western family gatherings, are well established 
in Western drama, film, literature and folklore, and are likely to arise whenever 
the conjugal couple attempts to gather together its scattered mature offspring 
and their ‘families’. The principle of the independence of each conjugal 
household sits uneasily with necessity for order on such occasions. There are no 
readily shared rules about authority or seniority to guide behaviour, instead, an 
anarchic individualism. The contrast with the African tradition, with its idiom of 
formally ordered kin relationships, determined by age, gender and descent, is 
stark.  
 
                                                          
14 Van den Berghe (1978) helpfully defines bi-lateral descent as ‘a social rule of descent that 
ascribes equal or nearly equal significance to all ancestors’. 
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Typically, in the Western conjugal system one has, over a lifetime, membership 
of two conjugal family households: one into which one is born, and a second 
one created by marriage (Reality is of course more complex: a minority never 
marry, or marry more than once, but Parsons is describing the ideal type).15 
Conjugality is the central privileged relationship in this system. The coming 
together of the conjugal couple (traditionally in marriage) is the cue that a new 
household is about to be formed. This tight relationship between household 
formation and the couple is the hallmark of the Western system. Marriage takes 
place at a relatively late age because the (self-selected, same-age) couple must 
acquire the means to set up their household and live independently of other kin. 
Western wedding gifts reflect this emphasis on household (cutlery, crockery and 
electrical gadgets for the non-elite, with lists now fashionable to acquaint friends 
with what will be required) in contrast to, say, traditional Indian wedding gifts 
of jewellery and lingerie to adorn the bride and thence to enhance her fecundity. 
She has no need of household goods because (in a patrilineal system) she will 
join her husband’s parents’ household which is already established and 
equipped, inherited down the generations of successive sons and their wives. In 
southern African black society new wives were similarly absorbed into an 
existing domestic group. By contrast husband and wife in the West are in 
principle both outsiders in relation to one another’s natal families: the 
continuing participation of each in their own childhood families, once so 
intimate, is now altered, constrained and limited by their new allegiance to their 
spouses. It is in this sense that each conjugal family is structurally isolated (not 
to be confused with socially isolated: the ‘discovery’, by Parsons’ critics, that 
married people often maintain close contact with their natal group, strengthens 
rather than undermines his analysis). 
 
 
The Historic Roots of the Western Household  
 
Historical research shows that this conjugal family household is a resilient social 
form. It has been characteristic of English society for at least 500 years. 
Macfarlane (1986) says 700 years. The ‘discovery’ of the antiquity of the 
conjugal family household in the Western Europe must be credited to Laslett 
(1965) who by 1971 had encouraged the transcription, from parish registers and 
other listings between 1538 and 1841, of details of households in over 90016 
English communities (Laslett, 1972: 256-7). He had also co-ordinated the 
comparative study of pre-industrial communities in France, Serbia, Japan, 
                                                          
15 A Weberian device whereby social scientists select as defining characteristics certain 
observable aspects of behaviour or institutions and exaggerate these to from a coherent 
intellectual construction. (See Marshall 1994:231) 
16 Ziehl’s dismissive statement that ‘Laslett bases his claims about England on one 
community alone’ (2002: 27) suggests unfamiliarity with his extensive work. 
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colonial North America to establish how common or uncommon this conjugal 
household was (Laslett & Wall, 1972). Serbia and Japan, with their relatively 
high proportions of complex households, emerged as significantly different from 
the Western European communities where, despite similar household sizes, 
complex households never constituted more – and usually much less – than a 
fifth of all households (Laslett, 1972: 61).17 Wall (1972:159), examining printed 
sources on 409 English settlements for the same period, concluded that ‘multiple 
family households, or extended family households….are certainly impossible to 
discern in the statistics’.  
 
This work of the Cambridge historical demographers threw a gigantic empirical 
spanner into the comfortable assumption on which sociologists had been 
coasting for half a century, namely, that conjugal households were the creation 
of industrialisation. The implied hypothesis of an inevitable world-wide 
convergence of family patterns as industrialisation spread, suddenly seemed less 
secure, as Goode (1963), its most distinguished exponent, was the first to 
acknowledge18. The alternative hypothesis, that the adoption of a conjugal 
household might induce industrialisation, remained attractive. Goody (1972) and 
Hajnal (1969) both toyed with the idea that English household formation might 
have been significant in triggering the industrial transformation there. 
 
It was left to Macfarlane to take this idea further. As he explains, ‘If the family 
system [of England] predated, rather than followed on, industrialisation, the 
causal link may have to be reversed, with industrialisation as a consequence, 
rather than a cause, of the basic nature of the family’ (1978: 198). He argued 
that the English data lent no support to the popular notion that the industrial 
revolution in England had transformed a peasant population, reliant on family 
labour for production for itself, into a proletariat, selling its labour to capital. 
There had been no discernible peasant population in England for centuries. He 
found no evidence of family ownership of land and little of continuity of 
ownership by descendants. Instead there was a vigorous property market dating 
back to the thirteenth century, with individual titles bought and sold. Wage 
employment had been widespread in England at least four hundred years before 
industrialisation, with a mobile labour force of young people needing to 
accumulate resources before marriage. He characterises thirteenth century 
English people as ‘rampant individualists’ ‘Ego-centred in kinship and social 
life’ (Macfarlane, 1978:163). 
 
                                                          
17 Ziehl (2002: 27) once again misrepresents Laslett, who was perfectly aware that some 
people spent some of their lifetime in extended family households. See Laslett and Wall, 
Table 1.3 (1972: 61).  
18 In the Preface to the 1971 edition of his work. 
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By 1986, he had assembled a great deal more evidence in support of this 
hypothesis through an examination of marriage transactions (Macfarlane, 1986). 
As early as the twelfth century, the young couple had been required to form an 
independent unit at marriage, which necessitated savings, and hence allowed 
capital accumulation. Notions of private property – ‘the impartible individually 
owned estate which could be bequeathed to specific individuals’ (Macfarlane, 
1986:340) – were well established by the 13th century, including children’s 
individual right to property independent of their parents. As servants, 
apprentices and wage earners, people saved in order to take independent 
personal responsibility for themselves right into old age. He argued that the 
basis of this conjugal family household system was a pervasive philosophy of 
individualism which had preceded urbanisation, industrialism, democracy and 
Protestantism, and could ‘float free’ of them (Macfarlane, 1986: 343). In such a 
society, non-kin institutions – the state, the guild, the towns with their 
independent charters – held sway. Kinship was of little consequence. Kin were 
narrowly defined, their influence confined to the domestic sphere. 
  
Following this line of argument, we suggest we should say of the conjugal 
family household that it weathered the transition to industrial capitalism rather 
well. 
  
The unsettling implications of this work remain largely unassimilated in 
sociology. The inevitability of the transition from extended to nuclear families 
has been uncritically absorbed into much South African sociological writing. 
Indigenous African communities have presumed to be set – if not far advanced – 
on such a course, if not by choice, then by relentless bureaucratic and economic 
pressures. ‘Evidence’ of the progress of such a transition has been sought in 
counts of the proportions of black households exhibiting apparently nuclear 
composition despite Fortes’s (1958) demonstration that such procedures were 
likely to be unreliable, since they overlooked the inescapable cyclical changes in 
co-residence effected by births, marriages and deaths. The work especially of 
Murray (1976, 1981, 1987), Spiegel (1980, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 
1996), Sharp (1987, 1994) and Webster (1987, 1988), with their finely observed 
detail of the complexity of black co-residential patterning, has by and large been 
ignored. Proponents of an inevitable transition to nuclear family household draw 
strength from theorists like van den Berghe (1978) who has gone further than 
Goode by explicitly linking such a process to social evolution. He argues that 
elaborate kinship belongs to the past ten thousand years of human history, to be 
eclipsed by the rise of states. His contention that the nuclear family is a natural 
species-specific form is woefully ethnocentric. African societies have developed 




Southern African Kinship and Household in 
Times Past 
 
The Western conjugal family household is traditional for only a small minority 
of South Africans. Not even all white South Africans trace their descent to a 
north-western European diaspora. Greeks, southern Italians and others 
descended from peasant societies have different expectations of kin and 
marriage (Hajnal, 1969). The African tradition is very different from both. The 
contrast has been spelled out in many publications (Caldwell & Caldwell 1990; 
Goode, 1970; Goody, 1973; Lesthaeghe, 1989). Ethnographic texts are one 
published source on this tradition in South Africa. A surprising newer source is 
to be found in the recent writings of the new generation of historians of South 
Africa, who show great sensitivity to the unique role of black kinship and 
household formation as factors shaping the South African past, and have 
recovered valuable and vivid evidence of black domestic life stretching back 
over a hundred years. It is to this source that we turn first. 
  
 
The Nineteenth Century: Insights from the New 
Historians 
 
South African historians working in the eighties have paid particular attention to 
the role of black domestic institutions in power struggles in the nineteenth 
century.19 With far greater sensitivity than that shown by sociologists to the 
importance of domestic group, they present in their writings a series of vignettes 
of the way black kinship actively shaped and was reshaped by the new 
circumstances of industrial and settler expansion. For example, in the way 
Shaka, by siphoning off the young men from their homesteads into regiments to 
minimise challenges, institutionalised a division of labour at the homestead by 
age and sex in which women and children played the major agricultural role, 
thereby unwittingly smoothing the way for capitalist penetration via migrant 
labour in the twentieth century; or the way Shepstone manipulated the levels of 
bridewealth in the Natal Code to ensure a steady labour supply without 
disrupting the system of homestead production and chiefly control; or the way 
black patriarchal power and patrilineal descent made sharecropping with white 
landowners on the highveld a viable option for a brief period at the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
 
The historians confirm the picture of domestic life a hundred and fifty years ago 
already portrayed by the ethnographers working fifty years before them (from 
                                                          
19 Inaccurately, in the opinion of anthropologist Hammond-Tooke (1984).  
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whom they are anxious to distance themselves)20 of societies in which 
‘agricultural production for subsistence needs was undertaken largely within 
individual homesteads, grouped in lineage-based villages’ while  
 
‘surplus produced in the village was thus extracted in the form of 
tribute paid by the commoners to chiefs, who were in turn expected 
to redistribute at least part of this to the old and needy and in the 
form of ritual feasts to the community at large’ (Marks & Atmore, 
1980: 10).  
 
Chiefs and lineage heads controlled both the distribution of land and that ‘pivot 
of society’, cattle, upon which everybody depended (as bridewealth) for 
marriage (ibid). The resilience of the patrilineal homestead, as the tributary 
power of chiefs was steadily undermined by colonial, capitalist or settler 
invasions and innovations, was striking. Throughout the surging changes of the 
nineteenth century, ‘the patrilineal lineage structure, which was given material 
expression in the homestead, remained more or less intact’ (Marks & Atmore, 
1980:12).  
 
Harries (1982) selects kinship as the single most important factor structuring 
social relations in pre-colonial southern Mozambique. He analyses the power of 
homestead heads to control the labour of able-bodied younger kinsmen – 
including migrant labour to South Africa – through control of bride-price, even 
when, following cattle epidemics, this was paid in cash earned by the young 
men themselves. Keegan (1986a, 1986b) confirms the centrality of the black 
patrilineal kinship system to the economic survival of poorer white farmers on 
the highveld in the nineteenth century, who survived by sharecropping with 
displaced black families. The whites had title to land but lacked capital and 
labour to work it. Black people had almost no land but plenty of homestead 
labour, and cattle, for draught. Sharecropping brought black and white into a 
symbiosis which lasted well into the twentieth century. Black productivity rested 
on patriarchal command the patrilineally extended households – a fact well 
appreciated by the white landowners, who, for instance, in Klip River in 1906, 
vigorously opposed the anti-squatting laws of 1895, which defined black 
families in Western conjugal terms, and then limited them to five per farm. To 
farmers’ dismay the law invariably caused ‘the whole kraal’ to leave the farm. 
They petitioned that 
 
‘its enforcement interferes with one of the principles of native 
family life. The general practice is for a married man to live with 
                                                          
20 Marks and Atmore (1980: 9) write, ‘though every anthropological monograph has its 
information on aspects of production and technology, there are considerable difficulties in 
using this material for the precolonial period; pitfalls which historians ignore at their cost’. 
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the head of his kraal; either his father, or, if his father is dead, his 
eldest brother. The strict enforcement of the present law 
necessitates dismissing young married men, members of the larger 
kraal’ (Keegan, 1986b: 239). 
 
Wider kinship links were continuously exploited in the black strategies to secure 
a livelihood, but these same kinship obligations exerted ‘levelling tendencies’ 
and inhibited the accumulation of exceptional wealth. As Keegan observes,  
 
‘kinship obligations still remained intact. Even where the extended 
homestead had given way to the nuclear household (as was 
generally the case with the Christian elite) there still seems to have 
been a sense in which the patrilineage had a claim on accumulated 
capital, particularly livestock, should these be required to 
commence or re-establish tenant farming’ (Keegan, 1986a: 84).  
 
Trapido (1986) shows how rich white investors exploited black land shortage 
and extended family structure, in similar fashion. The mine magnates Marks and 
Lewis settled the first of 250 black families as sharecroppers on their twenty-two 
farms on the Vaal River in 1879. This arrangement  
 
‘had the advantage of providing not only rent and labour, both 
domestic and agricultural, but capital in the form of horses, oxen, 
ploughs, wagons and housing. It ensured that the tenant family by 
self-exploitation would produce food, part of it handed over as rent, 
the other part exchanged in the market place for commodities’ 
(Trapido, 1986: 339).  
 
Beinart (1980) writes of the persisting viability of homesteads as Pondo chiefs 
lost out to traders as suppliers of scarce goods at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In both Slater’s (1980) and Guy’s (1980, 1982) accounts, Zulu kinship 
practice plays a central role. Slater describes ‘the remarkable revival in the 
economic fortunes of the lineage’ following the ‘overthrow of Zulu power’ 
(Slater, 1980: 155). Guy’s analysis of the destruction and reconstruction of Zulu 
society focuses on bride-price. He identifies the Zulu king’s control of all 
marriages, through the age-grade regiment system, as a major source of his 
power. The effective diversion of these young men (via hut and poll tax, and 
statutory fixing of bridewealth payments) from the king to the mines, railways 
and farms was the colonial state’s trump card, leaving intact lineage-based 
homestead production of subsistence and labour. Guy gives us the most detailed 
reconstruction of this ‘patrilineal lineage system’ (Guy, 1980: 113-118), but he 
is carried away by his theoretical imperatives, and his account is a little wooden. 
His claim that ordinary men amongst the common people (‘ninety percent of the 
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population’) had ‘two or three wives’ each stretches demographic credulity. 
Likewise, his neat account of the process of homestead fission, in which ‘every 
man in Zululand on, or soon after, his marriage would set up a homestead of his 
own’, is too readily informed by Western assumptions: a man without grown 
children would have little incentive to leave his father’s labour-rich homestead. 
Fission there certainly was, but only when and if a man had sufficient labour to 
make such a move practicable. Significantly, Guy makes no mention of 
inheritance of the homestead, for in his account all children leave home.  
 
For all their preoccupation with the lineage mode of production, the revisionist 
historians do not always deliver as much as they promise. As radical 
materialists, concerned above all with the place of the black majority in shaping 
South African history, they take black domestic institutions very seriously, but 
their sensitivity to change as a pervasive fact of history, combined with the 
benefit of hindsight into what lay ahead, infuses their accounts with an 
understandable pessimism. If racist capitalists who were about to triumph and 
remake the world in their own image chose to let certain ‘traditional’ African 
practices and forms persist, that was only to manipulate them, to drain them of 
their original content, thereby deceiving a gullible population into an easier 
submission. Their work is marked by a reticence to recognise and celebrate the 
independent viability of African patrilineal structures. With perhaps too great a 
readiness to concede the destructive power of capitalism, they choose to 
document the relentless transformation of the self-sufficient landholding 
homestead, with its complement of patrilineally linked kin under patriarchal and 
chiefly control, into little more than a source of migrant wage labour. One 
misses from their accounts that phase, noted by Arrighi (1979: 165) when 
homesteads, still secure in the indigenous African economy ‘raided the money 
economy’. 
 
Revisionist historians’ insistence on the power of the impinging alien economy 
in the nineteenth century to destroy indigenous institutions leaves one with the 
impression that any assertion that such systems somehow survived into the 21st 
century must be misguided. This is doubtless the source of their disquiet with 
the earlier ethnographies. It would indeed be foolish to think social 
arrangements devised for the 19th century would persist unchanged through the 
cataclysmic experiences of the 20th century. But we should not underestimate the 
resilience of old institutions to linger on as models for modified behaviour under 
changed circumstances. We certainly should not discount the creative power of 
people to adapt their cultural resources to new situations rather than to adopt, by 




The Early Twentieth Century: Ethnographers’ 
Accounts 
 
Early twentieth century ethnographers were struck by how differently kinship 
operated in the non-West. Fertility was at a premium. Polygyny, concubinage, 
levirate and ghost marriage all signified the preoccupation with increasing the 
number of descendants, upon which the ability to command a good life 
depended. People were surprisingly free to maximise descendants through 
several sexual partnerships. Polygyny was not the only route. A man could have 
children with a woman he did not marry. He might be obliged by custom to 
impregnate a woman on his brother’s behalf if the brother was sterile or, more 
surprisingly, dead. The contrast with the West, in the matter of sex and 
reproduction, could not be more marked. The emotionally and sexually 
exclusive conjugal couple, lynchpin of the family and central to the Western 
ideas of marriage and household, was invisible. Men did not even necessarily 
attend their own weddings (Hunter, 1936). But elaborate rules embodied 
strategies for claiming descendants, from the binding exchange of bridewealth, 
which gave men rights over all of a woman’s subsequent progeny, to the 
practice of fathers buying their out-of-wedlock children. Kuper (1947:88)  
describes the Swazi practice whereby a man could ‘simply lobola the children, 
leaving the woman to marry elsewhere’. Hunter (1936) reports the same practice 
amongst the Pondo. Descent rather than marriage was what mattered. Premarital 
pregnancies were not always welcomed but there was no conception of an 
illegitimate birth21. 
  
We cannot be sure how far this system, as reported by ethnographers in the first 
half of the twentieth century, had already been reshaped by collision with white 
settler society in southern Africa, nor how far the ethnographic record has been 
distorted by the selective perceptions of both informants and scribes. Both 
tended to assume a happier past before the coming of missionaries, settlers, 
investors, traders, speculators, teachers and bureaucrats. Both attributed the 
prevailing domestic discontents (sexual infidelity, extramarital births, 
recalcitrant children, errant sons) to the uncertainties brought about by too rapid 
a transition from a subsistence to a market economy. Some yearned for a return 
to a golden past. Others anticipated an affluent future, when black and white 
would be more happily integrated into a shared world economy.  
 
These early southern African ethnographers were uncommonly sensitive to 
historical context, despite the prevailing theoretical emphasis in early twentieth 
                                                          
21 Mair (1953), summarising existing ethnographic accounts of marriage and family in 
southern Africa, reports much harsher attitudes to premarital pregnancy, including the murder 
of the child (amongst the Kgatla) and of the families of both its parents (amongst the Zulu).  
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century social anthropology on the coherence of others’ social practices, and a 
disciplinary pressure to present cultures as bounded systems. Murray expresses 
a fashionable contempt when he dismisses them as ‘conceived within a 
synchronic and functionalist paradigm’ (Murray, 1981: 100), yet social change 
was a major preoccupation in their work, as Spiegel and McAllister (1991) 
acknowledge. Thus Hunter (1936) took the reaction to conquest as the major 
theme in her examination of the effects of contact with Europeans on the Pondo 
of South Africa. Kuper’s second volume on the Swazi (Kuper,1947b) is devoted 
exclusively to the impact of settler colonialism. Schapera (1971:7) described his 
account of married life amongst the Kgatla of Botswana as ‘a social history’ of 
the ‘transformation [of] the traditional domestic institutions’ after a century of 
exposure to ‘the influences of contact with Western European civilisation’. Far 
from reconstructing a golden tribal past, he opens his book with a courting 
couple eating chocolates in a taxi in Johannesburg. The contemporary neglect of 
these texts as colonial fossils is unfortunate for it deprives us of valuable 
insights into the past.  
 
From their work, a consistent picture emerges of distinctive black domestic 
arrangements in the second quarter of the twentieth century in southern Africa. 
In the countryside most people still clung to standards of domestic propriety 
shaped by centuries as agro-pastoralists in a relatively under-populated and often 
hostile continent, where lineage had served the dual function of enabling easy 
mobilisation for defence against predatory neighbours, and of maintaining 
numbers in an economy where labour was in constant demand. Despite the 
absence of increasing numbers of men, including now, (as not before), married 
men, rules of patrilineal descent still determined how domestic authority, rights 
and obligations were assigned.  
 
Hunter’s (1936) work is suffused with her perception of the decline of 
traditional Xhosa cultural practices and their replacement with a new 
individualism. Kinship was being eroded and was of decreasing importance as 
an organising principle of social life in Pondoland. She detected in the rural 
areas ‘a growing tendency for each married man to set up his own umzi 
[homestead]’ (Hunter, 1936: 59), rather than to remain in the homestead of his 
father, and a concomitant lessening of responsibility to classificatory fathers and 
brothers. The use of kinship terms was coming to imply little more than 
courtesy. Neighbours were replacing kin in social relations. Education, wages, 
the legal system and Christianity were undermining the authority of the elders. 
The circle of close kin was contracting to exclude all but those of the first 
degree. 
 
But it was in the urban areas that ‘the whole complex of economic obligations of 
kin’ was becoming ‘disorganised’ (Hunter, 1936: 449). She saw urban social life 
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as structured around new special interests: religious, political and sporting. 
Wealth and education were replacing descent as a determinant of status. A 
‘speedy transference of at least the superficialities of [European] culture’ 
(Hunter, 1936: 467) was occurring amongst the schooled elite: European 
fashion, European slang, European houses, furniture and food; parties with 
American rag-time music and the fox-trot, cinemas, concerts, afternoon tea 
parties, tennis parties, bathing picnics at the beach. As she says, ‘In towns it is 
smart to be as Europeanised as possible’ (Hunter, 1936: 437).  
 
For the poor, town life was harder. In 1924, a third of all non-white babies in 
East London were dying in the first year of their life. Half the surviving black 
children never got to school but were often left unsupervised to play on the 
streets, where eventually ‘sheer boredom drives them to drinking, gambling and 
hooliganism’ (Hunter, 1936: 476). Children were becoming disobedient and 
bad-mannered. Sons, liberated by wage earning, and by Roman-Dutch law 
which conferred independence at 21, neglected their fathers, who could now be 
sued for assault if they attempt bring them into line with a ‘traditional thrashing’ 
(Hunter, 1936:480). She writes of ‘a loosening of mutual economic 
responsibilities’ (ibid).  Although the amount  of money sent to the country 
remained ‘considerable’, permanent town dwellers did not ‘normally’ give 
money to fathers or elder brothers unless as payment for fostering their children. 
Hunter depicts the emerging urban household in East London as a conjugal 
family: ‘The usual household in town consists of man, wife and their minor 
children’ (Hunter, 1936: 59). They were unlikely to have kin living close by, 
since ‘relatives appear to make no special effort to establish their households 
near to one another’ (ibid.). This ‘smaller household group tends to draw 
husband and wife closer together’ (ibid.). She saw in the urban practice of 
giving children their own dinner plates a new individualism. Distinctions 
between maternal versus paternal kin were losing significance for children 
growing up without wider kin. Undiscriminating Western kin terms, oom 
(Afrikaans for uncle) and auntie were being incorporated into the vernacular, 
replacing older classificatory kin terms. The same carelessness about kin terms 
amongst younger Tswana had been reported by Schapera (1971). Away from the 
self-subsistence of rural areas, Pondo husbands were becoming less 
economically dependent on their wives, who were at the same time becoming 
less submissive to their husbands (Hunter, 1936: 461). Urban marriages were 
fragile, taking place at a later age, or not at all.  
 
Sexual licence was increasing, and, with the Christian attack on the older 
contraceptive sexual practices of the unmarried, ukumetsha, there was much 
premarital pregnancy. Ukumetsha, charmingly translated by Hunter as 
‘sweethearting’, is more earthily defined by the Mayers (Mayer & Mayer, 1961) 
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as external intercourse. By presenting a girl’s parents with a series of gifts 
including cattle, a boy had been able to establish his (non-exclusive) right to 
spend nights at her home, but was strictly prohibited from impregnating her. 
Non-penetrative sex was also practised when young people spent nights together 
as part of the ritual of other people’s weddings. Knowledge of the practice was 
part of a girl’s initiation. It was explicitly not a preliminary to marriage: ‘Elders 
disapprove of the marriage of sweethearts’ (Hunter, 1936:190). A similar 
disdain for love matches was reported by Kuper for the Swazi. 
 
 
Ancestors and Missionaries 
 
Customary domestic practices had been traditionally legitimated by those most 
powerful and conservative members of the lineage, the dead, who were 
accordingly placated, cajoled and appeased in an essentially domestic religion, 
ancestor veneration. This low-key cult, with occasional rather than regular 
rituals of sacrifice, no of full-time officiates, and an unsystematic dogma, had 
been under sustained attack since the early foreign intrusion of Christian 
missions. In demanding that people renounce their faith in the prevailing power 
of the ancestors, Christianity came close to unravelling, single-handed, the entire 
domestic fabric of southern African society. Prudish, locked into British 
Victorian morality, the missionaries disapproved of almost all the domestic 
practices the ancestors safe-guarded, including the making of beer, so central to 
ancestral rites. The Christian deities – three-in-one – legitimated a very different 
set of domestic arrangements – monogamous, conjugal, private family 
households on the Western pattern, established on the basis of sexual attraction 
and committed to lifelong sexual fidelity. Polygynous male converts were 
required to choose between their wives and abandon all but one (though 
polygynously married wives could be admitted to church membership).  
 
The sustained ferocity of this attack on the African family system has been 
nicely documented by Chiwome (1994:57), who portrays the missionaries as 
‘the vanguard of colonialism…trying to spread their economic and cultural 
tentacles into other lands’, encouraging people ‘to free themselves from their 
culture’ and adopt the goal of ‘material opulence’ (ibid.). Unsocialised 
youngsters were targeted via boarding schools. Western notions of marriage as a 
private arrangement between lifelong companions were encouraged, celebrated 
in white weddings which were so expensive, they were often postponed for 
years. Customary marriage came to be associated with the semi-literate and the 
non-literate. ‘Virginity ceased to be celebrated collectively…became the 
property of the woman alone’ (Chiwome, 1994.:62). Since sex was defined as a 
sin, people sinned less with wives and adopted mistresses, marriage with whom 
was now condemned. Children from lovers were condemned as illegitimate, 
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their mothers shamed and suspended from church membership; the notion of 
illegitimate as against legitimate children was assiduously cultivated. The attack 
on the levirate relieved the brothers and nephews of a deceased man from the 
responsibility of looking after children and wives of the deceased. Traditional 
patterns of inheritance were destructively reinterpreted.  
 
Little wonder that Hunter (1936:269) had detected ‘a growing carelessness’ 
about the performance of ancestor rituals amongst the Pondo, and a growing 
scepticism about their efficacy, which ‘weakens the influence of the ancestor 
cult as a sanction for respect for seniors and the solidarity of the family. In the 
urban areas, local authority rules undermined the practice by banning slaughter. 
Urban children were growing up without the rituals of sacrifice to patrilineal 
ancestors . Amongst the Kgatla of Botswana at the same time, Schapera 
(1971:27) reported that Christianity had become so firmly established that ‘little 
active trace now remains of the old system of worship’ in which ‘each family 
group worshipped the spirits of its dead ancestors’. Kuper (1947b:127) 
attributed the ‘weakening of the ancestral cult’ amongst the Swazis in the 
nineteen-thirties to Christian mission influence.  
 
Twenty-five years later, the Mayers (1961:150) by contrast found ‘the ancestor 
cult proved tenacious enough to survive transplantation to town’, and described 
the ingenuity with which sacrifices to ancestral spirits were made in East 
London, despite stringent municipal rules against slaughter except at an abattoir. 
By 1961 Hunter, introducing a new edition of her work on the Pondo, likewise 
acknowledged a resurgence of tradition. Spiegel and McAllister in 1991 
interpreted such recourse to tradition as a reaction to too rapid a pace of social 
change and stressed the changed content of such ‘tradition’. 
 
The appeal of Christianity lay in its ability to bring alternative power to people 
through literacy, schooling, education, and hence to more rewarding 
participation in the new industrial capitalist order which was being thrust on 
them. The appeal to women – very evident in the sex ratios of Christian 
congregations – lay in the liberation it promised from their traditional subjection 
to male, lineage authority in the domestic realm (see especially Kuper, 1947b: 
10). At first the choices seemed stark, but by the thirties many people were 
having their cake and eating it. Hundreds of new independent syncretic 
churches22 were not only accommodating ancestors in the Christian pantheon, 
but offering new opportunities for ‘self-display and power’ to people otherwise 
tied down to an ‘ideal of conservative mediocrity’ (Kuper, 1947b: 125). 
Members of established denominations were making their own private 
adaptations to the conflicting demands of kin, Jehovah and Jesus. Hunter 
                                                          
22 In 1932 Brookes was able to list 327 registered ‘Native separatist churches’ (1933: 
Appendix 1). By 1939 the number had grown to 550 (Kuper, 1947b: 122). 
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(1936:268) describes the devious ways church adherents hedged their bets by 
surreptitious ritual animal sacrifices passed off as modern or christian 
celebrations, with tell-tale relics of the  inkomo yobuluunga23 ‘discreetly 
wrapped in a piece of black cloth’ round the neck. 
 
 
The Later Ethnographers 
 
The Mayers (1961) and Pauw (1963) capture something of contemporary urban 
domestic life amongst the Xhosa in East London twenty-five years on. It was the 
division of the Xhosa into two culturally discrete groups, Christians or School 
and Pagans or Red, which struck the Mayers in their boisterous account of the 
adaptation of country-bred Xhosa to town life. The latter were ‘not just a few 
picturesque survivals’ but ‘a flourishing half of the Xhosa people today’ (Mayer 
& Mayer, 1961: 4).  
 
At their request, local headmen (from the ‘Bantu Areas of East London and 
Kingwilliamstown Districts’) had no apparent difficulty in 1958 in assigning and 
listing every homestead in their ward to one or other side of this two-fold 
classification. The Mayers trace these two ‘cultural camps’ to ‘the different 
reactions of an earlier generation to a particular conquest situation over a 
hundred years ago’ (ibid). The School people opted for Western institutions, the 
Reds rejected them. On the reckoning of the headmen, traditionalist Red 
homesteads in 1958 outnumbered modernising School homesteads, 9,300 to 
7,000. The Mayers argued that the same distinction had been observed for other 
black communities in South Africa,24 and structured their book around the 
questions why and how, even while living and working in the town, some 
people should resist urbanisation. Their work on the assertively anti-urban Reds 
captures what they later considered a passing phase in East London’s social 
history, for revisiting the relocated (and, significantly, re-housed) black 
population of East London ten years later, they found the Reds losing their 
distinctiveness. The new urban milieu of wide streets and detached four-roomed 
houses were proving inimical to their old life-style centred around beer-drinking 
cliques in the slums. By 1970 most Reds had conceded the inevitability of their 
children’s assimilation of elements of School culture (Mayer & Mayer 1970).  
 
                                                          
23 A specially appointed cow from the homestead herd, dedicated as an intermediary with the 
ancestors, the tail hairs of which are ritually plucked and twisted with bark to make a bracelet 
or necklace, which is worn by the supplicant till it disintegrates or until their request is met 
(Hunter, 1936: 235-40). 
24 Wilson says that the rural-oriented migrants in Cape Town are school-educated, and ‘in the 
country distinguish themselves form ‘reds’(Wilson & Mafeje1963: 17). 
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In the late fifties, most East London Xhosa were still patrilineally or 
matrimonially entitled to attachment to a rural homestead , the membership of 
which swelled and contracted with births, deaths, marriages, migration and 
unemployment. The rural homestead was ‘a unified pyramid with the 
grandfather at the apex, rather than (as in some other systems) an aggregation of 
nuclear family cells’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961.: 97). The Xhosa preference for 
having children reared by their grandparents meant that many homesteads were 
three-generations deep, with the homestead children being the offspring of a 
variety of homestead members, many of them absentees. The rural homesteads 
of School people differed little from those of the tradition-loving Reds. More of 
their unmarried teenage daughters were likely to have had babies, and more of 
these daughters were likely to have migrated to town, leaving the babies to be 
absorbed (with more guilt and consequent deception) into their maternal 
grandparents’ kin group.  
 
A vivid picture of a variety of urban domestic groups and life-styles in the late 
fifties emerges from the Mayers’ account. To the School people, towns 
represented an opportunity to ‘get on’, to become more sophisticated, to dress 
better, to own insignia of wealth, fashion and smartness, to become more fully 
‘civilised’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 207-9). Already acquainted, through school, 
with parties, picnics, cinema, concerts and ballroom dancing, they were ‘morally 
free to become urbanised’ (Ibid). Since there were different levels of attainment 
of these goals, School people were more diverse than Reds, presenting, in town, 
an embryonic class-stratification.  
 
A major difference between School and Reds lay in the urbanisation of their 
women. Unlike School wives, who aspired to urban employment, Red wives 
always lived at ‘home’ in the countryside. They belonged to the ‘kraal’ and 
visited their husbands in town infrequently, and then only with pressing purpose 
– usually medical or financial. Rather it was the duty – and pleasure – of 
migrants to visit their rural homes. ‘Since his wife is not primarily ‘his’ in an 
exclusive sense, the Red husband does not consider that he has any right to take 
her with him when he goes back to town’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 99). Red men 
unhesitatingly said that the closest kinship tie a man could have was with his 
parents, not with his wife.  
 
Although School people felt the need to honour the obligation of young wives to 
their in-laws, many experienced a contrary pressure, to maintain at least a 
semblance of monogamous conjugal closeness by taking wives with them to the 
urban areas. Some men brought their wives to town to forestall the temptations 
of infidelity. Some wives insisted on accompanying their husbands for this same 
reason. Other men left their wives in the country precisely to enjoy, more 
anonymously, the pleasures of adultery in town, away from eyes of prying 
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country neighbours. Both the Mayers and Pauw  report a high level of marital 
infidelity amongst spouses of either sex. To School women, married and 
unmarried, the town offered an escape from traditional restrictions , and an 
opportunity to earn money with which to acquire the accoutrements of 
civilisation – clothes, furniture, ornaments – which Red women despised.  
 
At the other extreme were those Reds who despised European culture and 
resisted urbanisation by deliberately encapsulating themselves in an exclusively 
rural-orientated social network, who lived their town life as ‘an extension of 
home community life’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 94). They had come to town 
solely in order to build up and support their rural homesteads. They avoided 
social contact with strangers and clung to rural norms. ‘Whether a man’s 
residence in town extends to six months, five years or a quarter of a century, 
observance of these rules can keep him country-rooted and culturally Red to the 
end of his stay’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 96). 
 
Whereas young unmarried School migrants were likely to attach themselves to 
an established urban household where they had relatives, young Red migrants 
literally shacked-up with age-mates in all-male lodgings. But since sex was 
prohibited in the cramped shared space (it was seen as turning the room ‘into a 
kind of brothel’ ( Mayer and Mayer, 1961: 103)), many sought rooms of their 
own, by choice in the, ‘tumble-down and slummy’ sectors where these Reds 
chose to concentrate (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 109). Not all Reds opted for this 
particular form of encapsulation. Some become caught up in alternative, tight, 
essentially urban, social networks. Thus some joined gangs of deviants, ‘the 
urban riff-raff’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 181) who lived by their wits, and cut all 
ties with their rural homes. A minority got caught up in one of the evangelical 
black urban churches with ‘predominantly poor and uneducated congregations’ 
(Mayer and Mayer, 1961:193). They too found themselves unable to go back 
home: ‘Very few Red men will venture to come home as committed Christians 
if they have a Red father alive’ (Mayer and Mayer,1961:203). The Mayers’ 
enthusiasm in contrasting these alternative reactions to urban life is apt to 
distract our attention from the many others who simply drifted between the two 





Married or single, Red migrants were free to strike up a liaison with one of the 
divorced, widowed or otherwise spoiled-for-marriage mature, single women 
found in both town and countryside, the amankazana (Xhosa term) or 
amadikazi, (Pondo term) who maintained their own independent quarters 
elsewhere. Like Hunter in 1936, the Mayers had some difficulty finding an 
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English equivalent for this category of women who for various reasons (like 
widowhood, separation) were no longer eligible for marriage, but remained 
under the guardianship of their fathers or elder brothers, constituting a pool of 
potential lovers amongst whom married men might legitimately find mistresses. 
With some diffidence the Mayers called them concubines, but suggested that 
this over-emphasised the purely sexual element in their position. The Mayers 
write, ‘Strictly speaking a woman who has once been married is always entitled 
to the status and appellation of a wife (inkosikazi) even if she chooses to play the 
role of inkazana. The inkazana in the strictest sense is a woman who remains 
outside marriage’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961:235). It is essentially a Red institution, 
by which a woman, ‘although unmarried, is permitted to have full sexual 
relations and bear children….preferably with married men’ (ibid.). Their 
existence reminds Westerners how differently Xhosa handle(d) issues of sexual 
partnership and reproduction. Spiegel’s (1991:150) account of bonyatsi - a more 
or less long-term secret affair between two already married people - amongst the 
Sotho, together with Peters’ (1983:119) statement  that ‘having regular lovers is 
common practice among Botswana’, demonstrate that the Xhosa are not unique 
in southern Africa in the explicit institutionalization of extramarital promiscuity 
(or what Therborn (2001:4) in a nice phrase calls ‘an absence of moral sexual 
asceticism’)  
  
Hunter (1936:205-8) had described the amadikazi as ‘a very large class’ in 
Pondoland, found in rural as well as urban areas. She noted that ‘practically 
every married man has his special friend among them’. They were ‘always 
noticeable by the number of their ornaments and elegance of their clothes, 
presented by their lovers’. They were more leisured than wives, were the best 
dancers, and the artists of the community ‘having more leisure to do elaborate 
beadwork or embroidery’. More surprisingly, ‘Any woman is flattered if you 
greet her as idikazi’ (ibid.). Some girls chose to become amadikazi rather than 
wives, for the relative independence it conferred. The Mayers (1961:236) judged 
their status to be ‘less dignified than that of wife’ but ‘by no means to be 
despised’.  
 
Sometimes a migrant’s liaison with such a woman became so established (often 
through pregnancy) that she moved in with him, to become his ishweshwe, his 
live-in lover. Ukushweshwa, living together, is an exclusively urban institution. 
Amongst Reds it refers to a relationship struck between a married man and his 
inkazana. His wife would remain with her children at his rural home, usually 
with his parent(s), possibly at his own homestead, if he had managed to establish 
one. His new urban domestic group established by ukushweshwa, although 
superficially resembling a family formed by a second, polygynous marriage, was 
regarded very differently. It lay outside the web of kinship that marriage spins 
between descent groups. His parents, so central to the life and role of his wife, 
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would never meet his ishweshwe. She was not considered related to them. In 
accordance with the rules of patrilineal descent, an inkazana’s children 
(invariably she has children) belong to her own clan and lineage, the clan and 
lineage of her father, unless their father were to claim them by cattle exchange. 
Amongst the Pondo in 1936, five head were required. None of her children ever 
visited their father’s rural home. His financial support of them might be very 
generous, but it was always voluntary rather than obligatory. The relationship 
was always in principle temporary and essentially private. The Mayers 
(1961:265) describe the institution as complementary to marriage, catering for 
married men and ‘women who will never have husbands’. 
 
School people also entered what they called ukushweshwa relationships, but 
these were quite unlike the relationships struck between amadikazi and Red 
men. Instead they resembled the pattern of living together found in the West, 
where a young unmarried couple contemplating marriage, possibly against their 
parents’ wishes and without their consent, move in with one another as the first 
stage in what they see a more permanent relationship. Unlike Reds, young 
School migrants saw town as a place to find suitable wives, but once married 
they were as likely as Reds to send their older children to be brought up by 
paternal kin in the rural areas. 
 
 
Some Problems with Classifying Urban 
Households 
 
This rather drawn out recapitulation of some of the Mayers’ findings serves two 
purposes. It reminds us how comprehensive an account of black town life the 
Mayers produced, such as was not to be possible for the rest of the century:25 
neither the intellectual nor the political climate has since supported such an 
undertaking by outsiders. And, in its uninhibited detail, it also provides material 
for illustrating some of the limitations of a census-style approach to household.  
 
How might such a series of domestic groups appear in a household census? The 
first type of Red household, joined rather than established by the new migrant, is 
an all-male group of peers, some of them close kin. Classified by ‘family type’ 
(a usual procedure in household surveys), each person might be recorded as a 
separate single-person households. Or they might appear as one household 
comprising ‘unrelated’, ‘mixed’ or ‘other’ relatives. If the latter, it would 
probably appear at the top of any income scale, since every member would 
likely be employed. Although their wages, individually, would be low, 
collectively they would present a higher per capita income than, say, a school 
                                                          
25 See Beinart (1991) for an account of the Mayers’ own misgivings. 
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teacher living with a (house) wife and children. But since the sole rationale of 
Reds being in town is to support the rural homestead, such classification would 
be very misleading for a major share of this income would be likely to find its 
way directly back to rural kin in other domestic groups, of which the men would 
certainly count themselves members. Classified by type of headship (another 
commonplace of the household survey), these would be male-headed 
households, though in the rural area the men, if young, would all be subordinate 
to older kin. 
  
Once a man moves into his own separate accommodation, he constitutes a 
single-person household. Out of sight is not only his rural kin group, but his 
inkazana or idikazi, whose household circumstances we have not yet considered. 
We know she is likely to be a single-parent, but we cannot guess where her 
children are living. If she is widowed they might be with their paternal kin. If 
she is divorced they might be with her maternal kin. If she has never married, 
any arrangement is possible, including having the children living with her. There 
are similarly many possibilities for her own residence, which may be with one of 
her relations, a sister, a brother or a parent, or may be in her own single quarters.  
 
Should she move in with him as an ishweshwe, they together form an apparently 
nuclear family, but, as the Mayers makes clear, this is a very different kind of 
household. She is likely to have children from some other man, for whom she is 
responsible, and  whom she will at this stage (if not before) send to live 
elsewhere, since Xhosa men are very intolerant of sharing households with 
another man’s children. The woman is additionally uniquely responsible also for 
any additional children from this kushweshwa relationship, for ‘the genitor, 
taking no formal steps to establish his status [vis-à-vis his child] acquires neither 
rights nor obligations’ (Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 277). Any support for the 
children from their biological father in this kind of household rests on his whim 
and her wiles, and comes at the expense of his support for his legitimate family 
in the rural area. A household survey which presumed that the effective 
household income, for this apparently nuclear family, was the combined income 
of both partners, shared exclusively amongst their joint children (a normal 
Western ‘nuclear family’ assumption) would be drawing very misleading 
conclusions. 
 
Urban households of School people have an unpredictable – and fluctuating – 
membership, as lodgers, relatives and children move in and out of them, 
shuttling between town and country, and one town and another. They are very 
unlikely to replicate the demographic structure of the land-holding homestead – 
of which they may be considered a kind of outpost – but they often are three-
generational. Pauw (1963: 137-140) suggests a domestic cycle amongst the 
permanently urbanised – (a rare category in 1960, which he had difficulty 
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identifying) of alternating two- and three-generational households, shaped by the 
premarital pregnancies of daughters, which he singled out as ‘the most notable 
feature’ of urban family structure. But not a distinguishing feature: Murray 
(1981:110) noted how common ‘the three-generational household which 
includes an unmarried daughter with her children’ was in rural areas of 
Botswana, Lesotho and ‘the Bantustans’. A generation earlier, Hunter, on the 
basis of 213 urban households in East London, had reached a different 
conclusion: 
  
‘the standard group is that of parents with their own children’ 
(Hunter, 1936: 460).  
 
But since Hunter had herself established that  temporary migrants outnumbered 
the permanent townspeople 2 to 3,26 some selective perception is at work here. 
Pauw’s conclusion that, ‘contrary to what might have appeared to be the trend 
on earlier stages of urbanisation, the elementary family is not the predominant 
form of domestic family amongst that part of the population which has been 
established in town longest’ (Pauw 1963: 139), can perhaps be accused of a 
contrary bias, for his own figures for his small sample of 109 households show 
more households of this elementary family type than any other, though they are 
only a third of all households, and involve only 28 per cent of the sampled 
population.27 Meanwhile Hunter (writing under her married name Wilson)28 was 
busy re-affirming the trend to nuclear family households in her newest study of 
Cape Town (Wilson & Mafeje, 1963). 
  
Wilson revels in the urbanisation of black people as an inevitable universal 
trend, deplores the way the state has inhibited it,29 and welcomes inevitable 
social change with unfettered optimism: ‘something new is growing in towns: its 
mark is …intense vitality…irrepressible humour’ (Ibid:181). Stressing the 
universal rather than the particular, she and Mafeje draw attention to the 
similarities between the urbanisation of black people in Cape Town and 
urbanisation in Britain. Their starting point is the way the people differentiate 
and categorise one another, first on the basis of commitment to an urban as 
opposed to a rural culture, and then, within these, on the basis of lifestyle. The 
                                                          
26 43.2 percent were permanent, 56.8 percent temporary (Hunter, 1936: 434). 
27 His four main household types are: multi-generation with male head (20%); multi-
generation with female head (23%); father, mother and children (38%); mother and children 
(19%). See Pauw (1963), Table 18. 
28 ‘The writing of the book was done by Professor Monica Wilson’ (Wilson & Mafeje, 1963: 
vii). 
29 The Appendix (Wilson & Mafeje, 1963: 182-184) provides an admirable summary of 
inhibiting legislation to 1963. 
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differences are matters of attitudes and values, and are reflected in spending 
patterns.  
 
True ‘townsmen’ constituted about a third of all Africans in Cape Town in the 
late fifties. Amongst these they distinguish three sets: first, the Western-
orientated elite of educated Christian professionals, for whom ‘status is linked 
with a Western way of life’ (Wilson & Mafeje, 1963:146); second, the 
successful businessmen; and  third, the less successful, streetwise urbanites who 
start life as school drop-outs, drift into gangs, ‘given to smoking dagga and 
fighting with knives’ while young, working the system as pilfering employees 
when older (Ibid: 23). The latter are politically astute, contemptuous of 
Christianity; ‘Crooks and smart guys, and crooners, commanding big money, 
provide their ideal’ (Ibid: 146). They stand in marked cultural contrast to the 
first group, who are educated professionals, with ‘ a lively interest in national 
and international politics’ (Ibid: 27), invariably church-goers, often with 
international connections, who speak English amongst themselves, play tennis, 
go ball-room dancing and ‘entertain’. 
 
Amongst all these three groups they detect30 the declining importance of the 
extended family, clan and lineage and ‘a withdrawal from the wider kinship 
group’ (Wilson and Mafeje, 1963: 82), though grandparents, siblings and their 
children still ‘visit and cooperate’ (Ibid: 74). Young married couples prefer to 
live on their own. The changed economy of urban life, especially the absence of 
shared inheritance of substantial property, has undermined the basis of lineage. 
As for clan names (iziduko), they are ‘out of fashion’ (Ibid: 76). Even the rules 
of clan exogamy are questioned. They perceive the elementary family as the 
only definite corporate kin group and, within it, relations between men and 
women are more equal than they were in the past, because of the education and 
earning power which women now enjoy. Husbands and wives eat together. 
There is no polygyny,  but ‘concubinage’ flourishes, and is much resented by 
wives. Married men frequently have ‘girl-friends’, and gain kudos from their 
fellows by taking them out to parties and picnics while wives stay at home (Ibid: 
80). 
 
Lingering concern with wider kin is expressed in the importance attached to 
attending their funerals, and, in times of misfortune,  in the frequent recourse to 
diviners  who nourish ‘the power of the shades’( Wilson & Mafeje, 1963:112).  
 
In sharp contrast, are the rurally-rooted migrants who, whatever their marital 
status, come to town as single men. They comprised a third of Cape Town’s 
black population in the late fifties. Unlike the ‘encapsulated’ traditionalist 
                                                          
30 With more enthusiasm than evidence: ‘the range of kinship relationships which are actively 
maintained has not been adequately assessed’ (1963: 74). 
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migrants described by the Mayers in East London , migrants to Cape Town have 
usually had some schooling and are mostly Christian. As they note, ‘migration 
to the Cape has been selective’ (Wilson & Mafeje, 1963: 17). Nevertheless, the 
migrants in Cape Town are despised by true townsmen as ‘uncivilised or raw’ 
(Ibid: 14). They stint on food, clothes and accommodation in order to send 
money to their wives and children in the country. They usually live in barracks 
with other men from their rural district, adhering to formally enforced rules of 
conduct learned back home. Married or single, they may take lovers, or ‘town 
wives’, and take advantage of restrictions against the movement of women to 
‘enjoy themselves with young women’ (Ibid: 79). Though stereotyped as 
ignorant and gullible, they are called upon to assist with the traditional rituals of 
circumcision of young men, to which almost all townsmen, whatever their 
sophistication, adhere. For initiation is strictly a clan matter and amongst 
migrants, clan identity remains daily salient, even for Christians. It cuts across 
other social bonds, like those between room-mates which are established on the 
basis of place of origin. Clansmen come together for births, marriages, deaths, 
sickness and whenever else sacrifices to ancestors are necessary.  
 
The remaining third of the black population are the ‘half-and-half type who are 
in the process of being assimilated as townsmen but are not yet accepted’ 
(Wilson & Mafeje, 1963: 14). Generalisations about them are more difficult to 
find in this impressionistic account. We are told nothing specific about their 
domestic life, but they are presumably amongst those whose ‘expenditures on 
travelling in proportion to wages earned’, in order to maintain the involvement 
in far-flung kinship networks, ‘are a never failing source of astonishment to the 
outsider’ (Ibid: 74). 
 
Wilson and Mafeje’s study reinforces the Mayers’ insistence that the black 
urban population presents a highly diverse society, most clearly stratified by 
acceptance or rejection of the culture of permanent urbanisation, but also by the 
degree of success people have in exploiting the opportunities offered by the 
urban areas.  
  
 
Counting Nuclear Households 
 
I have elsewhere attempted to unravel the ideological underpinnings of the 
contrary perceptions of the incidence of black nuclear families (Russell, 2002). 
The persistent preoccupation with this issue is reflected in the frequency with 
which such counts have been published. A careful quantitative study of data 
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collected in 1946 from over a thousand31, mainly Zulu, Durban factory workers 
by two black scholars in two months, showed  22 per cent of the men belonging 
to ‘conjugal families’ defined as ‘families consisting of the worker, his wife (or 
wives)[sic] and children (if any)’ (Burrows, Scully et al.,1948: 187). They 
comment,  
 
‘The conjugal type of family is characteristic of Western society, 
and the substantial proportion of such families among Dunlop 
African workers may be a measure of their detribalisation’ 
(Burrows, Scully et al, 1948: 188).  
 
Their willingness to classify polygyny as ‘conjugal’ is quite characteristic of this 
mind set, where all kinds of definitions of nuclear family are stretched to 
maximise the degree of Westernisation. Steyn (undated) makes a good example 
when she says the ‘Bantu family’ is becoming more and more like the nuclear 
type, ‘but three factors give it a different complexion from the pure nuclear 
family’ (Steyn undated: 33, my translation, my emphasis). She then lists several 
non-nuclear attributes. Exceptional ‘African’ definitions of the nuclear family, 
to include descendants, ascendants and collaterals, are similarly devised by 
Hughes (1964) and Amoateng (1997). A more imaginative use of this 
classification by household composition, as recorded in large data sets, has been 
made by Simkins (1986). Comparing frequencies of black household types 
(nuclear and extended) in rural and urban areas over time, he found remarkable 
stability and similarity in the distributions: urban households were not much 
more likely to present a nuclear form than rural households, nor did frequency 
distributions change much over time. He concludes, ‘if there is a trend towards 
the nuclear household it is a very weak one’ (Simkins, 1986: 41). Even Spiegel, 
who describes black nuclear families as ‘a pipe dream’, has been tempted by the 
simplicity of this classification: although nuclear family households in urban 
Cape Town are ‘often only short-lived’, he and his colleagues counted them, to 
discover that ‘at least 61 per cent of the households surveyed could not have 
comprised nuclear family units’ (Spiegel, Watson & Wilkinson, 1996: 8), 
(leaving a substantial 39 per cent which could be so classified).  
 
As Fortes (1945, 1958) demonstrated half a century ago, co-residential 
household composition cannot be understood outside the temporal processes of 
formation, consolidation and dissolution. Goody confirmed that ‘the rhythm of 
domestic cycle differs from society to society’ (Goody, 1972: 105). Nene (1988) 
has stressed the need to go beyond household membership to family process. 
Similarly Peters (1983: 105) has warned against ‘an over-reliance on devising 
[household] typologies’ at the expense of understanding ‘dynamic processes’. 
                                                          
31 Four consecutive samples of 1 in 4 of the thousand-odd Africans working at a tyre 
manufacturing company. 
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The fallacy of deducing a transition to a nuclear family system from a count of 
the relative frequencies of household types had already been lucidly exposed by 
Murray (1981: 101-102). He found only 18 percent of his sample of 150 
households in Lesotho to be de jure nuclear families, but insisted that this is 
‘one typical phase of the developmental cycle’ (Murray, 1981:104).  
 
In short, typologies on the basis of kin composition, fairly simple to extract from 
a survey, tell us very little about relationships and interdependencies. Where this 
is the only source available (as for the British historical demographers reliant on 
ancient parish listings), it cannot be ignored; the Cambridge demographers have 
demonstrated the ingenuity with which such listings can be manipulated to 
produce convincing reconstructions of social structure. But where, as in South 
Africa, we are surrounded by informants who can explain what they are doing 
and why and how, it seems perverse in the extreme to proceed as though such 
listings were our only source. Yet this has been the chosen route of many 
sociologists.  
 
Household size has proved another irresistible variable, tempting many analysts. 
Laslett in 1972 cautioned against attributing too much to it. Although often 
treated as a preliminary indicator of household structure  ‘mean household size 
in a community does not appear to be correlated at all highly with degree of 
complication of the household in that community’ (Laslett, 1972: 15-16). The 
point is proved by Beittel (1992: 218) in his useful summary table of trends in 
black household composition in Johannesburg, extracted from the Bureau of 
Market Research surveys of black household income and expenditure from 1962 
to 1985. Although average household size remained fairly stable over the quarter 
century, (at its smallest 5.1 in 1970, at its biggest 5.6 in 1962), its composition 
changed noticeably. The proportion of female-headed households doubled, from 
a mere 14 per cent in 1962 to 29 per cent in 1985. At the same time, children, 
who made up 52 per cent of all household members in 1962, steadily shrank to a 
mere 25 per cent in 1985. ‘Other relatives living in households rose in the same 
period, from 6 per cent of household members to 20 per cent. It also became 
much more common for children over 18 to be part of the household. In short, 
while black household sizes remained unchanged (probably constrained by the 
accommodation provided) they became more adult and more complex over the 
period. By 1985, Johannesburg children were conspicuous by their absence. 
This was a time of great political tension, with urban school pupils in the 
forefront of political resistance, and urban education subject to constant 
disruption. Many parents would have seized the opportunities of kinship to 
disperse their children to safer rural areas. In demographic terms, the households 
became increasingly unbalanced. Goody (1972) argued that most domestic 
groups, world-wide, regardless of culture, are about the same mean size – 




Chiwome (1994) blames the Christian missionaries for undermining black 
family life in southern Africa by introducing the notion of marriage as the 
lifelong companionship of an independent monogamous couple. A similar 
analysis has been made by Lesthaeghe et al for West Africa: they refer to 
‘Christian penetration with its concomitant ideology favouring conjugal 
closeness’ (Lesthaeghe, Kaufmann & Meekers, 1989: 240). The attack on 
African marriage was severe and sustained. It is now all but forgotten that in the 
Cape as late as 1953 the courts ‘refused to regard as valid any marriage in which 
cattle had passed’ (Mair, 1953:19).  This ideological pressure has since been 
reinforced by secular Western mass media.  The two distinct models for 
marriage coexist uneasily: the traditional African one, explicitly structured about  
fertility and a sexual division of labour; and the traditional Western one, 
structured about companionship of a conjugal couple. The former is in principle 
polygynous, and although the incidence of polygyny is low, the principle gives 
to relationships between spouses a formality and a distance that Westerners find 
strange. In the Caldwells’ words, as long as polygyny is accepted ‘all women 
must anticipate the possibility and order their family emotions and economy 
accordingly’ (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1990: 199). Hunter (1936:461) suggested 
that amongst the Pondo the ancestor cult, with its continual reminder that wives 
were outsiders, protected by different ancestors, inhibited conjugal closeness. In 
Swaziland, as in many other African societies, many wives still kneel when 
presenting their husbands with food, and may not utter their names32. Similar 
rituals of deference mark relations between children and their fathers and 
grandfathers, wives and their in-laws. 
 
This kind of traditional marriage is not a couple-centred institution, but is rather 
concerned with the linking of two descent-based groups. The marital 
relationship is of less importance than relationships of descent. Indeed, Fortes 
(1969:308) argues that in descent-based systems marriage is not essential: ‘What 
is essential is parenthood, and for this any form of permitted procreative 
cohabitation is sufficient’. Goody (1969: 114) confirms the ‘transitional’ nature 
of the family in some societies, with continuity and stability necessary for the 
persistence of the system provided by descent groups and locality. Hellmann 
(1935) working in Johannesburg observed that claims of kin got precedence 
over claims of wife.  The Caldwells observe that wives are in control of their 
sexuality but not their fertility which is ‘a matter for her husband and his 
lineage’ (Caldwell & Caldwell, 1990: 209). Schapera (1971: 319) captures the 
nature of conjugal relations in Botswana in the thirties: ‘it is often enough little 
                                                          
32 A British family’s horrified confrontation with this practice is recorded in a documentary 
account made in 2000. See Russell (2001). 
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more than a prosaic partnership for economic and social purposes and for the 
production of legitimate offspring’. Romantic love is perceived as destructive 
within marriage: 
 
‘If you have to love one woman more than someone else (whether 
sibling, parent or partner), then a rationale is established for 
splitting society into spatially distinct groups based upon 
monogamous unions. In polygynous societies, ‘love’, in the sense 
of preference of one above another, is often a dangerous thing’ 
(Goody, 1973: 38).  
 
Durban factory workers in 1946 saw relatively little of their wives by Western 
standards. During the (average) sixteen-month work spell, married men were 
visited by their wives for an average of 3.2 weeks (Burrows, Scully et al., 1948: 
114-115). The more recent the marriage, the less likely the wife was to visit her 
husband, since  
 
‘According to custom a newly married woman may not leave the 
parental hearth if she is the wife of the first son and heir, while if 
she is the wife of any other son, she cannot be released from the 
strict supervision of the mother-in-law until the fields have been 
ploughed, the crops harvested and her own household food supply 
assured’ (Burrows, Scully et al,1948: 113). 
 
Unfortunately we have no information on how often these men went home. But 
we do know that 15 per cent of married men failed to returned to their homes 
during the two-week vacation over Christmas when the factory shut down. Only 
65 per cent of married men sent money to their wives, 
 
‘which in a European society would be a surprisingly low figure. In 
Bantu society, however, it is customary for money sent by sons to 
go to the head of the family… who gives what he thinks fit to the 
wife and supervises the use she makes of the money. Marriage does 
not automatically lead to a ‘hiving off’ and the new wife becomes 
in fact a member of her husband’s family’ (Burrows & Scully et al, 
1948: 146). 
 
The Mayers write: ‘Far from setting value on conjugal closeness, Red Xhosa 
etiquette actually forbids a young husband to be too intimate with his wife’ 
(Mayer & Mayer, 1961: 98), and again ‘the particular form of the husband-wife 
relationship among Red peasants is such that a husband who goes away to town 
is not necessarily conscious of a great deprivation of marital rights’ (ibid.). As 
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they wryly acknowledge, ‘These features of traditional marriage play into the 
hands of the labour migrancy system’ (ibid). 
 
The agnatic system is relatively impervious to corrosive interpersonal emotions. 
Passionate sexual relationships, which underlie the establishment of Western 
households, have no constitutive role in the agnatic system. Indeed, as we have 
seen, they are explicitly discouraged as the basis for marriage in several 
southern African societies. Thus, in Swaziland, a wife chosen by a man on the 
basis of love never ranks as highly in a polygynous household as one chosen for 
him on the basis of more enduring qualities like rank, pedigree, or clan (Kuper 
1947).  
Instead, sexual passion and romance have an explicit place outside marriage, 
where they cannot threaten domestic stability. Extramarital sexual adventuring is 
institutionalised amongst the Xhosa in the amadikazi, and amankazana, and 
amongst the Sotho in bonyatsi. This explicit dissociation between romantic love 
and marriage in ‘traditional’ African marriage is another marker distinguishing it 
from ‘traditional’ Western practice, with immediate implications for co-
residential patterning. 
 
The alternative model for marriage, vying for legitimisation and finding it in 
church and Western media, is the exclusive close conjugal couple. Van der Vliet 
(1991) depicts how Xhosa women (but not men) envy white women for 
experiencing the sexual fidelity and intimacy which the conjugal marriage 
system demands. But the cost is a high rate of marital breakdown and marital 
unhappiness in the West, where expectations of enduring conjugal bliss are set 
unrealistically high. Murray is adamant in attributing to married couples in 
Lesotho a desire for conjugal closeness, arguing that to admit anything less 
would be to give sustenance to the migrant labour system. He deplores ‘a 
distinctively African view of marriage and the family which does not 
presuppose intimacy between husband and wife and which is not therefore 
undermined by the separation of spouses’ (Murray 1981: 103), and suspects 
those who express such views of endorsing the base practices of capitalist 
employers.  
 
The Caldwells (1981) suggest that once the conjugal tie becomes central, 
concern and expenditure are concentrated on the couple’s own children rather 
than amongst the wider kin group. The flow of wealth between generations is 
simultaneously reversed, for in the traditional system, wealth flows from 
children to parents as a right. They suggest that the direction of the flow of 
support can be used as an index of the type of marriage. Another index can be 
found in the length of post-partum abstinence observed by couples (ibid). 
‘Westernised’ couples tolerate only the shortest period of abstinence because 
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prolonged abstinence threatens the sexual intimacy which underpins the 
‘emotional nuclearisation’ that characterises such marriages. Prolonged 
abstinence suggests a more traditional African conception of marriage. Data 
collected in South Africa in the nineties from a small sample,33 suggest that, by 
this criterion, two-thirds of black urban and ninety-five per cent of rural black 
respondents favour ‘traditional’ marriages (Russell, 2002). But other data from 
the same sample indicates less commitment to traditional relations in marriage, 
especially amongst urban respondents, more than half of whom, for example, 
expected marital fidelity of one another, and more than half of whom opted for 




The Circulation of Children 
 
The practice of distributing children is continent-wide (Page, 1989), almost 
certainly predating the economic and political upheavals of colonialism and 
industrialism. African children are expected to circulate between kin, as needed, 
for errands and companionship. In West Africa, ‘support for, and benefit from, 
child raising are rarely borne exclusively by parents but are shared by many 
people (Bledsoe & Isiugo-Abanihe, 1989: 442). The Caldwells  reckon that up to 
a third of children in Nigeria and Ghana are fostered to relatives. They paint a 
picture in which the daily care of children is diffused. Children belong to all 
older members of the lineage. In the villages, it is often difficult to know who is 
responsible for their feeding, ‘for they wander from one relative’s cooking pot to 
another’(Caldwell & Caldwell, 1990). Similarly costs are widely shared, and 
few West Africans feel significantly less responsible for the schooling costs of 
their nephews and nieces than for those of their own children.  They explicitly 
exempt the ‘urban elite’ from these generalisations about villagers. 
 
In southern Africa, children are expected especially to spend time in the 
household of their  grandparents, both maternal and paternal; paternal, because 
this is their line of descent, and maternal because this is where they are likely to 
have been born and to have spent their early years, particularly if they are first 
born. This is the consequence of the drawn-out nature of black marriage in 
southern Africa, where the classification ‘married/unmarried’ is not easily made, 
and where the status of the union between a newly marrying couple is, as 
Murray (1981:103) says, ‘constantly susceptible to redefinition’. Children can 
also be sent to childless relatives, especially to their parents’ siblings, and of 
course to paternal grandparents from whom they receive their patrilineal 
identity, and with whom they significantly ‘belong’. 
                                                          
33 One rural sample (n=110) and four urban sub-samples (n=358).  See Russell (2002).  
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Schapera, writing of the Kgatla of Botswana in the thirties, reports that a relative 
with no children, or with children of only one sex would ‘ask for the loan of a 
child, but often enough parents agree beforehand that their next child will be 
‘born for’ some particular relative, to whom it is accordingly given soon after 
weaning’ (Schapera, 1971: 220). Hellman (1956) found 31% of children in a 
black Johannesburg township in 1949 to be living with rural relatives. Van der 
Waal (1996:51) describes how in the Northern Province, children were 
‘circulated between households’. Over a quarter of all children observed during 
one year had been fostered by ‘maternal grandparents and other matrilateral 
relatives or their own older sister’ (Van der Waal, 1996: 41) (presumably 
staying with paternal kin was not considered fostering). Mehlwana (1996: 91, 
98) describes how a Cape Town clanship ‘facilitates child-keeping and child-
exchange’, and how such movement of children ‘cements relationships’ . Peters 
(1983:119) on the other hand, notes the resentment often felt by grandmothers in 
Botswana, overburdened with care of absent daughters’ children. 
 
This practice makes the kinship structure of domestic groups opaque to the 
standard social survey, with its standard method of going no further than asking 
how each member is related to the homestead head. A clutch of children 
correctly identified as ‘grandchildren’ – or with greater refinement ‘son’s child’ 
or ‘daughter’s child – may or may not have parents living in the homestead, may 
or may not have parents actively contributing to the costs of their upbringing. 
More significantly, it is perfectly within the rules for a grandparent to claim a 
grandchild as one’s own, especially if its mother is one’s young, unmarried 
daughter.  
 
A concomitant of the dispersal of children is the neutralising of the emotional 
relationship between parents and their own biological children – whether as 
cause or consequence. Laslett (1977:37) suggested  that the effect on the child of 
its parents and siblings is greater in ‘the western tradition’ than in other cultures. 
Van der Waal (1996) was indeed struck by how different from her nuclear 
family expectations and experience the bond between parents and children was 
in the Northern Province. ‘The pattern of children’s dependence on parents 
differed…because the social relationships that developed around a child were 
not mainly or exclusively those with family (sic) members’.  
 
Murray (1981:104-106) observes, in a nice phrase, ‘the centrifugal distribution 
of children between households’ in Lesotho, but insists, at passionate length, 
that this has less to do with traditional expectations than with immediate 
economic pressures. Spiegel (1986) likewise depicts the flow of children 
between households as a response to poverty. The same argument is made by 
Reynolds (1995).  
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Reynold’s suggestion  that a group of 24 black South African political dissidents 
had had a peculiar upbringing in this respect is as surprising, coming from a 
social anthropologist, as is her implicit assumption that children brought up 
without a nuclear family are somehow damaged and disadvantaged. Despite her 
disclaimer that nuclear families are not necessary for children’s stability, her 
conception of ‘family’ remains doggedly nuclear: implicitly, children should be 
brought up by their father and their mother. She uses this as a marker of 
domestic stability. Examining the childhoods of her informants for 
‘disturbance’, she finds that ‘only 8 per cent lived in nuclear families for all of 
their first 20 years’ (Reynolds, 1995: 30). The distribution of children becomes 
in her terms the ‘fragmentation of care’. More recent research suggests ‘that this 
social arrangement does not detrimentally impact on child welfare’ (May & 
Roberts, 2001:108, citing Maluccio et al 1999). Rather than recognise the 
security to be derived from the experience of a wider circle of actively caring 
kin (not to mention the precocious independence such experiences confer 
(Russell, 2002)), Reynolds links mobility with insecurity: ‘only’ five of the 
dissidents had spent their first 20 years in one address; ‘only’ one had not 
experienced bonds with caretaker being broken by death, migrancy, or marital 
disruption (Reynolds, 1995). She regards the high rate of premarital pregnancy 
amongst them, now that they are adult, as pathological. Gloomily she predicts 
that ‘the flux and complexity’ of her informants’ childhood years ‘may be 
continuing in their adult years’ (Reynolds, 1995: 33).  
 
More usefully, Reynolds  establishes the contemporary norm for children’s 
place of upbringing in South Africa by analysing data from 8,8000 households 
collected by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) in 199334. Fifty-two per cent of African children live in households 
that lack their two parents. Only 34 per cent of African children had two parents 
at home for at least half of the month preceding the survey. She concludes that, 
at any time, two thirds of African children are likely to be living apart from at 
least one parent. While it is undoubtedly true, as she says, that the South African 
state ‘consistently and awfully undermined the ability of people to form and 
nourish families over time’ (Reynolds, 1995: 33), her assumption that these 
would, by choice, be families in which parents reared all of their own children, 
shows a surprising indifference to a wide-spread African practice which seems 
to have little to do with political regime. Perhaps what should be emphasised is 




                                                          
34 Now more commonly referred to as the Project for Statistics on living Standards and 
Development, PSLSD. 
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Analysing the same data base   (to assess, inter alia, the impact of household 
structure on educational attainment), Maharaj, Kaufman & Richter (undated) 
found some 17 per cent of black South African children age 6 to 19 are fostered, 
usually by a grandparent or by one of their parents’ siblings  (but a quarter of 
them live with none of these relatives). 30 percent of black children live in 
households containing fostered children. The impact on their education and that 
of the non-fostered children in households is minimal. Indeed, schooling is often 
the motive for fostering. They draw attention to the fluidity of household 
structures as these children move through kin networks.  
 
Isiugo-Abanihe (1985, cited Harber (undated)) distinguishes four types of 
fostering common in Africa besides the crisis fostering, familiar in the West:  
 
1. Kinship fostering – to ensure the most effective use of resources within a 
kin group and to strengthen family ties. 
 
2. Alliance and apprenticeship fostering - to give children a chance of 
social mobility, usually to live with someone who will teach them a trade. 
 
3. Domestic fostering – usually a girl sent to give domestic help to a 
relative.  
 
4. Educational fostering - a contemporary from of apprenticeship fostering 
which entails sending a child to live with someone who will pay their 
school fees.   
 
 
Unmarried Mothers and Patrilineal Descent  
 
Patrilineal rules ensure that the child will have a proper identity, either that of its 
biological father or that of its mother’s father. Once again the agnatic idiom 
displays its flexibility in the ingenuity with which different southern African 
groups manipulate the patrilineal principle to ensure the legitimacy of every 
birth. In principle, children belong to the lineage of their (socially defined) 
father. This is their legitimacy. In Jones’s words, ‘an extramarital child’s 
position is not compromised by the circumstances of his or her birth’ (Jones, 
1992: 252). The social nature of this definition introduces some latitude, which 
people manipulate in interesting ways.  Premarital and extramarital births 
provide the test cases. Premarital births are common35. Data from 1993 show 
                                                          
35 On the management of premarital pregnancy amongst Zulu people see Preston-Whyte 
(1981) and PrestonWhyte and Zondi (1992). 
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that about 43 percent of black girls had had at least one child by time they were 
19 years old, and at least a third of these young mothers returned to school after 
giving birth (Maharaj, Kaufman & Richter, undated). Such births lead to the 
creation of households headed by single women containing their unmarried 
daughters and daughters’ children. The suggestion (see Ziehl (2001:18) who 
attributes the notion to Marwick (1978) that we see in this phenomenon some 
kind of transformation from patrilineal to matrilineal principles, is to 
misunderstand patrilineal descent.  
 
Contemporary Swaziland provides a pertinent example. The rules of patrilineal 
descent to the Swazi are like the Bible to fundamentalist Christians, like the 
Pentateuch to Hassidic Jews. They are the charter. You have to know who your 
father is. This is public information of the most vital kind. In the eighties, 
unmarried pregnant girls with secret lovers had to reveal the lineage name as 
they went into labour to gain the protection of their proper ancestral spirits. 
Grandmothers landed with a houseful of progeny of their unmarried daughters 
would, on request, cheerfully produce a matching list of surnames for them. And 
sometimes when their memories let them down they would call a six-year-old 
from play and say, ‘Who is your father?’ Children always knew. Dogged with 
notions of nuclear family, I would want to know where father was and whether 
he was supporting the child. This type of information was much fuzzier, but 
grandmothers would always know where father’s patrilineal kin were. They 
would have had dealings with them; compensatory cattle or goats might have 
been exchanged or promised. Marriage might be in the offing – (nearly all Swazi 
marriages begin with pregnancy). They would know where to put the pressure of 
obligation if the crunch came. They would know which ancestors to appease if 
the child became seriously ill. If necessary, they would know where to send the 
child to live. 
 
The paternity of children of unmarried Swazi girls has relatively little (and 
decreasing) impact on where young children live: unless the father is rich and 
rural, they live with their mothers and/or their mothers’ mothers. But it is 
decisive for mate selection once children become sexually active. Sex with 
someone with whom you share descent is incest, not merely abhorred by all but 
doomed by offended ancestors. With increasing maturity, children gravitate to 
their patrilineal kin, who will be their negotiators in marriage settlements. If they 
are educated girls and likely to command a good bride-price, patrilineal kin will 
assert their patrilineal rights more vigorously. It is not uncommon to hear 
adolescent girls complaining that ‘Only now that I am getting educated my 
father is becoming interested in me’.  
 
So contemporary patriliny provides the framework which confers identity, 
despite a very high level of extramarital births. The Swazi accommodation to 
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births outside marriage is so smoothly accomplished and with such pat cultural 
responses suggested elsewhere ( Russell 1993) that the practice must be of very 
long standing: ‘traditional’ as they say.  
 
The suggestion that the high incidence of households headed by single women 
which we see in contemporary South Africa, is evidence of some kind of 
conversion to matriliny must be viewed with extreme scepticism. As Murray 
(1981:112) observes, a high incidence of births to unmarried women is ‘by no 
means incompatible with the persistence of the predominantly agnatic structure’  
 
Swazis situate such behaviour strictly within patrilineal rules. Who lives with 
whom has no consequences for who you are, or what your patrilineal 
entitlements are. Householding arrangements are inessential. The essentials are 
tied up with your isibongo, your patriclan name, which only your father can give 
you. It is this which defines who your kinsmen are, who your ancestors are, in 
which rural homestead you can claim a share. It also defines your obligations: 
whom you should support. And, of course, whom you should not marry. 
 
The older ethnographies insisted that the children of an unmarried woman 
belong to her father, since she is a minor and his ward. Once a woman marries, 
all subsequent children belong to her husband, who has, through payment of 
bridewealth has acquired her reproductive rights. The Swazi call it ‘buying the 
womb’. But what if the father of the unmarried woman has himself not paid the 
requisite bridewealth to legitimate his marriage to her mother? This is so 
common amongst the Swazi that the practice of promising anticipated 
bridewealth from the future marriage of yet unborn daughters has become 
institutionalised. In this case, the unmarried daughter’s mother is herself 
technically unmarried; the unmarried daughter bears mother’s maiden name 
which is of course, by patrilineal rules, the name of her maternal grandfather. 
Following the patrilineal rules, the newborn child too must take the name of its 
mother’s maternal grandfather.  
 
Nowadays, most Swazi practice a more direct way of asserting patrilineal 
principles, by elevating biological paternity as the cardinal principle in descent. 
Just when this new principle was introduced is uncertain. The ritual 
requirements around this assertion of biologically-claimed paternal rights, with 
compensation paid in cattle, suggest it is not new (Russell, 1993). The current 
price (the Swazi talk uncomplicatedly of ‘buying’ the child) is two head of cattle 
for a girl, one for a boy. Should the child’s father decide to marry its mother, 
these cattle are counted towards the bride-price.  
 
Swazi newspapers provide an unexpected source of circumstantial evidence that 
in the nineteen-fifties and sixties many extramarital children were not so bought, 
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but were seen as members of their maternal father’s or grandfather’s lineage. 
The evidence appears in the hundreds of legal notices published throughout the 
nineteen-eighties, to the effect that ‘So-and So wishes it to be known that he 
henceforth wishes to be known as Such-and Such, this being his natural name’. 
The choice of words is interesting. Lineage membership is acquired naturally 
through your genitor. It is this which determines who you really are (and with 
whom, therefore, you can and cannot have sex, and/or marry). By the nineteen 
eighties, the practice of immediately attaching a newborn premarital child, by 
name and ritual, to the lineage of its biological father was the norm. 
Identification of such fathers was not problematic. Fertility is a prized aspect of 
sexual prowess; promiscuity is the norm. Rather than holding out for children to 
be bought by their fathers, mothers often return them to fathers’ kin as soon as 
they are weaned, with the implication: ‘You bear their expenses!’. 
 
Cursory evidence from a small group of unmarried Xhosa mothers in Cape 
Town in 200236 suggest a similar concern with the bestowal of proper clan 
identity, especially for boys. The women considered it essential that each child 
be properly, ritually, introduced to its correct paternal ancestors, through 
somebody of its father’s clan, if not shortly after birth, then certainly before 
adolescence and initiation. For boys, this is no casual introduction, but an 
expensive ceremony, usually involving  ritual slaughter.  
 
Amongst the Swazi there is no agreement about the application of the principle 
in the case of extramarital births to married women. People are torn between the 
older view of children as an asset, and the newer reality of children as an 
economic liability, for they can no longer be relied upon (as in the past) to 
support their parents in old age. Indeed, in the AIDS pandemic they cannot be 
relied upon, whatever their filial piety, to survive long enough to offset the cost 
of their schooling. Some men still insist on claiming all their wives’ children as 
their own, regardless of biological paternity, and draw on ‘tradition’ to justify 
their claim, happily anticipating the labour children provide, the support they 
will get from sons in old age, and the bridewealth they will receive from 
daughters’ marriages. Others regard adultery as grounds for returning the wife 
(and this newest child) to her parents. Similar bald economic interests influence 
the way premarital births are handled.  
 
Patrilineal principles present the unmarried mother with many options for 
support for her children. The father’s kin group are in principle responsible, but 
the woman’s own kin and clan present an alternative resource. What to the 
Western outsider looks like instability to the insider looks like security. By 
drawing on the institution of ‘circulating’ children, such women can free 
                                                          
36 Focus group discussion, Bambanani Women’s Group, Khayelitsha, April 2002. 
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themselves for wage work if they need to, want to. They can send their own 
children away to be cared for elsewhere or they can ask for an older child from 
some other household to come and be attached to them for a while – perhaps in 
exchange for a promise of future school fees, certainly in exchange for board 
and lodging. In a similar way, women with young children are able to side step 
the stark choices confronting Western women. Conventionally posed as ‘family 
versus career’, this sounds like an option only for the educated elite, but the 
dilemma is as keenly felt by poorer working class women in the West, for whom 




The Salience of Clan  
 
Spiegel’s suggestion that the social networks which are cultivated in 
‘contemporary Africa’ are ‘as much in flux as other institutions’ (Spiegel, 1995: 
5) is surely a misrepresentation. To the contrary, everybody is de jure part of a 
social network which is in principle very stable, fixed by agnatic rules. Clan is 
the social expression of these rules. The most important clan is one’s own clan 
inherited from father, but of considerable importance also, when appropriate, is 
one’s mother’s clan, which is of course the clan of her father, and her brothers, 
each one of whom is that uncle (umalume) of whom all Nguni children are 
brought up to expect much.37 Murray (1981:56-64) captures the reality when he 
says that, despite the ‘perpetual ebb and flow’ of Sotho households as migrants 
themselves flow back and forth across the borders - both men and women, 
married and unmarried, fathering, mothering and dispersing children as they 
make and unmake fragile conjugal bonds - there is a ‘relatively stable agnatic 
structure’. The agnatic idiom underpins the apparently chaotic array of 
household forms. Webster (1987) used the same expression to characterise 
kinship in north-eastern Natal. Whisson (1976) noted the importance of clan in 
bringing order into newly urban settlements. Manona (1991:201,216) is more 
circumspect, arguing (with reference to ex-farmworkers in an Eastern Cape 
town) that although ‘the structural features of an agnatic kinship system [are] 
much in evidence’, it is filiation (parent-child links) rather than descent which is 
‘emphasised’.  
 
The distinction is, to the non-specialist, a subtle one, which Fortes explains: 
filiation is one generation deep, and involves both parents, whereas descent is ‘a 
relationship mediated by a parent between himself and an ancestor, defined as 
any genealogical predecessor of the grandparental generation or earlier’ (Fortes, 
1969: 281). It is ‘an actor-centred instrument for the assignment of right and 
                                                          
37 Never more graphically described than in a short story by Njabulo Ndebele (1983). 
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status or for establishing interpersonal or intergroup connections’ (ibid.). Fortes 
(1969:384) lists the purposes of the lineage established by such descent as ‘to 
endow with citizenship, avenge a wrong against a member, perform rituals and 
sacrifices of ancestral and similar cults, and carry out mortuary and funeral 
ceremonies for its members’.  
 
While it is indisputable that in South Africa, with its modern state apparatus, 
lineages do not endow citizenship or avenge wrongs, it is equally indisputable 
that there are descent groups which perform rituals of ancestral cults, and 
mortuary and funeral ceremonies for their members. These are the clans, in 
which, as Manona observed in 1985, there is a resurgence of interest. Clan 
defines a set of people who are potential kin. ‘In classificatory kinship system 
ordinary clans people can be turned into close kin’ (Manona, 1991: 216). 
 
Whatever clan may have meant in the past to Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi society, it 
now represents a set of people who, by virtue of their shared clan name, see 
themselves as descended from a patrilineal common ancestor. They are 
therefore all ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’. The Western practice, of limiting ‘true’ 
brotherhood to people sharing both parents, is integral to the Western kinship 
system: other (classificatory) systems (like the Xhosa) invest this particular 
relationship with less importance, and elevate, to equal brotherhood status, 
relations, who, in the West, would be considered too remote to know, for whom 
therefore no kinship terms exist. Manona calls it ‘putative or fictive kinship’ 
(Manona,1991: 216). In this he follows British usage (Holy, 1996:75).  It is 
British usage to call lineages ‘real descent’, while clans are ‘putative descent’. In 
the British tradition, Spiegel (1996) too calls clan ‘fictional kinship’. But there is 
nothing fictional about the bonds which you can assume, as a matter of course, 
with strangers who bear your clan name. As Manona says, ‘These clan-ties can 
be enduring since they are essentially instrumental’ (Manona, 1991: 216). To 
label such relations as fictional, is to adopt an unnecessarily Western view point.  
 
Clan identity determines how people address one another and how they behave 
towards one another, particularly in matters of sex. Sex within the clan is strictly 
prohibited. It is as incestuous as sex between siblings of common parents. It may 
also be prohibited between certain other clans linked by marriage, for example, 
one’s mother’s clan, or the clans of either grandmother. On the other hand, 
marriage may actually be prescribed rather than proscribed with these marriage-
linked clans. Amongst Swazis, marriage with a woman of the maternal 
grandmother’s clan is the most approved marriage possible. The Kgatla also 
prefer marriage between cousins (Schapera, 1971). Rules differ from group to 
group, but the point remains that descent identity has daily salience, dividing the 
people you meet into those with whom you may have sex and marry, and those 
who are too close to you for such behaviour. Clan and lineage are therefore 
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amongst the first things people want to know when they meet a stranger. ‘Who 
is your father?’ they ask. 
  
Mehlwana (1996) is surprised by the small space given to clan in ‘the classical 
studies’. Clan seemed to have so little salience for urban Xhosa in East London 
in the fifties that the Mayers overlooked it entirely. The index to their book has 
only three entries for it, and the references are insubstantial. Hammond –Tooke 
(1984) dismissed clan as significant only in matters of sex and ceremony. Hunter 
similarly had dismissed clan as having ‘no function other than the regulation of 
sexual relations’ (Hunter,1936: 462, 523) – as though this was an insignificant 
aspect of daily life. Twenty-five years later (writing under her married name of 
Wilson), she maintained her point of view. Although, in Cape Town, fellow 
clansmen were sought out for initiation and circumcision, ‘among townees and 
younger people generally iziduko [clan names] are out of fashion. The use of 
clan names has largely been displaced by the use of surnames which are 
required in all official contexts, and in dealings with whites’ (Wilson & Mafeje, 
1963: 76). She explains the colonial origin of Xhosa surnames (significantly 
called ifane after the Afrikaans van): ‘In an earlier generation, school families 
all took a name – usually that of a male ancestor but sometimes that of an 
admired European’ (ibid). Chiwome comments on how disorientating this 
practice was;  missionaries showed ‘little knowledge of the role of African 
nomenclature in creating a coherent social world’ (Chiwome, 1994: 59).  
 
Mehlwana’s (1996) impression is very different.  Working with a small sample 
in Cape Town in 1995, he found clan to be ‘embedded in people’s social lives’. 
He argued that, far from replacing kinship, as Wilson and Mafeje had argued, 
the new voluntary associations found in town were actually based on kinship in 
the form of clan. Although not every clansman was considered close kin, it was 
with clansmen that relationships were established. The shared clan name 
guaranteed an enduring relationships ‘through blood’ (Mehlwana, 1996: 24).  
 
All Zulu, Swazi and Xhosa children are made aware of the clan of their father 
before adolescence. Xhosa youngsters cannot be circumcised except with 
fellow-clansmen by a fellow-clansman. The people who gather together at times 
of crisis, to thank, consult or entreat their dead ancestors, are always of the same 
clan. Only the oldest among them are fitted to address the shades. The 
opposition of the missionaries to African conceptions of the family can be more 
readily understood once this link between the living and the dead is grasped. 
Ancestral veneration rests on a lively sense of the importance of the line of 
descent. By attacking family practices, the missionaries undermined indigenous 
religion, and by attacking religion they undermined indigenous families. 
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The earlier writers’ neglect of clan does not necessarily reflect badly on the 
acuity of their observation. It may be that before apartheid had hardened, 
acculturation to Western conceptions of social relationships and social 
organisation had been gaining ground. The apartheid project of ethnic 
segregation may have reversed this trend by its deliberate stifling of 
cosmopolitan experiences, and by its assiduous cultivation of distinctive ethnic 
practices. This was implicitly suggested by Hunter when she came to write a 
new preface to her older Pondo ethnography. She noted with some surprise the 
resuscitation of practices abandoned by the more educated a hundred years 
before, and condemned by them as ‘pagan’ and uncivilised’, including 
‘sacrifices to the shades’ (Hunter, 1961: xvi). The erosion of kinship in urban 
areas had not been as devastating as she had expected: kinship was holding its 
own alongside the new patterns of voluntary association. The contemporary 
prominence of clan consciousness may represent a resurgence of a notion that 
has been lying relatively inactive in the cultural repertoire, now revived to meet 
new needs in a new social situation. Manona (1991: 217) predicted a revival of 
agnatic kinship as part of a new African nationalism . It may be a counter to the 
anonymity of urbanisation, providing a ready-made but dormant network of 
potential kin. Spiegel’s data gathered in Cape Town supports such an 
interpretation. But not all migrants cling to old charters in making their 
adjustments to new economic circumstances. Ross, drawing on her experience 
of a mixed-race squatter camp forty kilometres from Cape Town, perceives ‘a 
demise of traditional institutions based on descent’ and their replacement with ‘a 
range of social sources’ such as ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘friendship’ to ‘verify 
belonging and ensure assistance’ (Ross, 1996 : 6).  
 
 
Rural Homesteads and Contingent Urban 
Households 
 
More recent knowledge of contemporary black families and households comes 
from several discrete, careful studies (inter alia Huisman & Sterkenberg (1982), 
James (1985), Moore (1994), Niehaus (1994), Sharp, Niehaus & Bank (1994)) 
from the last thirty-five years, during which the apartheid programme gathered 
momentum, reached its zenith, faltered and gave way to the New South Africa, 
still mired in the aftermath. Whatever the political orientation of the observers, 
they describe the adaptation of people fiercely constrained by economic and 
political pressures. These were not, of course, new pressures: but they had been 
made more intense after 1948 by the fanaticism of the Afrikaner Nationalists. 
Freedom of black movement, restricted from the start, was steadily curbed as the 
apartheid fantasy of all-white towns began to be implemented. With very few 
exceptions, the right to permanent urbanisation was in principle and in practice 
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denied to black people. Apart from the privileged few who had been born in 
towns, their stay in town became dependent on the duration of an employment 
contract. This impacted directly on strategies of what Spiegel (1996) calls 
‘domestic consolidation’. Any investment in urban areas looked increasingly 
risky, yet it was only in urban areas that essential waged work could be found. 
 
The tangled legislative history by which this apartheid project was almost 
accomplished has been published in many places. The Natives’ Land Act of 
1913, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, and the Native Administration Act 
of 1927 are familiar early milestones on the road to racial domination. As early 
as 1933, Brookes had been able to list 34 discriminatory legislative acts passed 
since the Union; thereafter the pace quickened. The South African Institute of 
Race Relations, founded in 1929 to ‘initiate, support, assist and encourage 
investigation that may lead to a greater knowledge and understanding of the 
racial groups’ (Brookes, 1933: 188), has since 1948 assiduously published, year 
on year, this sorry story.  
 
The impact on black domestic life has always been direct. In Murray’s phrase, 
families were divided. Simkins and Dlamini (1992) talk about extended family 
networks being fragmented. Spiegel (1994b) writes of households being 
stretched. Some observers have attributed this state of domestic affairs 
exclusively to the apartheid state. But the obstruction of black urbanisation and 
the exclusion of workers’ families had been the policy of successive segregating 
colonial powers before the Union. As Simkins and Dlamini (1992:67) observe, 
almost a century of conditioning ‘may have induced changes in attitude and 
expectations which may be self-sustaining and hard to alter’.  
 
The impact of changed government policy on patterns of urbanisation following 
the adoption of universal franchise in 1994 is as yet difficult to discern. Shared 
solutions to common problems can rapidly become ‘traditions’. There is an 
attractive individual freedom associated with the migration of the single worker 
to a distant workplace, however onerous the work. The exclusive emphasis on 
the social deprivation of the migrant, which has characterised liberal writing, is 
probably misplaced. Mabin (1990), Smit (1998) and Jeeves and Crush (1995) 
have cautioned against the assumption of any simple rural-to-urban transition in 
South Africa. Extrapolations from European experience fail to take into account 
the specific constraints and opportunities in the South African case: the 
symbolic as well as the practical attachment to land, the economy of land 
ownership under communal tenure, the value of a rural place as a safety net, the 
harsh experience of urban settlement in the past century, the unreliable urban 
labour market. The continuing attachment to land is not simply a reaction to the 
apartheid regime’s determination to undermine black urban settlement. Land is a 
valued economic resource, paradoxically nurtured by urban migration.  
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In 1995 Smit found 39 per cent of urban informants in Durban to have both rural 
and urban bases. He characterised many urban households as ‘loose units with 
only temporary urban bases’ (Smit, 1998: 77). For these, migration was circular, 
involving ‘multiple rural or semi-urban bases and a number of work sites’ 
(ibid.). In relatively affluent pastoral Botswana, Kruger (1998) found that thirty 
per cent of households in a poor suburb of Gaberone owned cattle which they 
kept elsewhere. Half had rural landholdings. Furthermore, the proportion of 
urban residents with rural assets increased rather than shrank with the length of 
urbanisation.  
 
Many older studies documented the dependence of rural homesteads on 
migrants’ wages. First (1977) observed the centrality of wages earned in South 
Africa for rural consolidation in Mozambique. Chirwa (1997) describes how the 
ban on migrant labour from Malawi to South Africa arrested a process of 
accumulation which was taking place in rural households there. Murray (1981) 
depicts a similar situation in Lesotho. Only the poorest households in Lesotho in 
the seventies had no absent migrant earners. He estimated income from migrant 
labour in the South African mines in 1976 to constitute 71 per cent of all 
household income. Without it, people left behind were unable to make effective 
use of their land. In Lesotho, farming and wage-earning were complementary, 
not alternatives.  
 
White resistance to permanent black urbanisation found resonance in black rural 
opinion, as the Mayers’ study of Xhosa migrants showed. Burrows & Scully et 
al. (1948) found only one in four married men prepared to bring their wives to 
Durban if good housing was provided. A similar finding was made for Estcourt 
five years later (Phillips, 1953). In the seventies Sotho mineworkers were still 
attached to the ideal of presiding over a rural homestead engaged in subsistence 
production (Moodie, 1991). This remained the ambition of Swazi men in urban 
employment in Swaziland in the eighties. 
  
Initially all townward migrants had, by definition, a rural base, but from the start 
there were always some younger men who were happy to break loose from the 
rural gerontocracy and explore the possibilities of a new urban lifestyle. All 
southern African languages have words for these absconders. But not all those 
who were drawn by the new opportunities of urban life were irresponsible riff-
raff. Far from it. Some of the more sophisticated and astute bought urban 
property, and attempted to settle permanently, but found themselves hounded by 
the state, deprived of their title deeds, their occupancy threatened. By the sixties, 
security of tenure of urban property looked increasingly shaky. Cutting ties with 
rural areas, once a sign of urban sophistication, now seemed rash. Any secure 
domestic consolidation would have to be rural. But it was just at this time that 
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South Africa’s economy boomed, simultaneously pulling people townwards. 
The political conflagration provoked by these and other tensions, and their 
resolution in the last decade of the twentieth century have been described and 
analysed elsewhere. This is the background against which we try to understand 
people’s residential and co-residential decisions. It rests for the most part on 
data collected under conditions of stress, from people whose options were 
unusually constrained.  
 
The rural homestead was always a loose assemblage. The prolonged absence of 
some members was common. Women, whose marriages contracted them to 
membership of their husbands’ homesteads, retained residual rights in the 
homesteads of their birth, and would periodically return there. Children would 
pay prolonged visits to maternal and other kin. The homestead might seasonally 
divide along age and sex lines, as in the Tswana cattle camps and gardens, or be 
drained of young males as in the Swazi and Zulu regiments, but it remained the 
base to which people returned throughout their lives, their rights to membership 
indisputable.  
 
The changed economic circumstances of, first, colonial and then industrial 
capitalist penetration set in motion new co-residential patterns, configured 
around the increasing necessity for at least some homestead members to earn 
cash in towns, or on mines (White farms were more likely to absorb the 
homestead en masse). Rural homestead composition was thus altered: working-
age people, particularly males,38 spent less lifetime at the homestead, but this did 
not alter their entitlement to membership. At places of employment, new 
domestic groups were formed. 
 
Unlike homesteads, the composition of these urban co-residential groups was 
not culturally prescribed, but was contingent upon any number of factors: the 
employer, who might provide anything from a sleeping space on a dormitory 
floor to a four-roomed house; the local and state authorities who assumed 
enormous and arbitrary powers to dictate urban entry and residence patterns; the 
sending homestead’s own labour needs, and the subsequent ease with which 
people could leave home without undermining the viability of the rural base; 
what we might call the ideological preferences of the migrant, whether to resist 
or embrace the new urban milieu and its new opportunities (significantly shaped 
by religious beliefs); and the purely personal needs of the migrants for food, 
shelter, companionship, sex.  
 
The linkages between rural and urban areas provide one source of evidence on 
the extent of incompleteness of domestic groups stretched between these 
                                                          
38 But Kalule-Sibiti and Kahimbaara (1996) report that in Transkei female out-migration now 
outstrips male out-migration.  
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different locations. The apartheid practice of ‘dumping’ ‘unwanted’ black urban 
residents in remote, dense, ‘rural’ settlements has muddied the always rather 
arbitrary distinction between rural and urban in South Africa. About half the 
black population of South Africa now at the start of the 21st century are still 
living in the countryside, half in urban areas. But not all rural residents are 
‘living off the land’. Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001) found 43 percent of rural 
households in a sample of 1,003 in KwaZulu-Natal to have neither cultivated 
fields nor stock. An extrapolation from this slight evidence suggests that a little 
more than a quarter of the black population is living the stereotypical African 
rural life of the coffee table books, growing food for the homestead, tending 
stock.  
 
Current rural-urban linkages are not as intense as in 1946 when data collected 
from urban factory workers in Durban showed that 91 per cent of single men 
and 98 per cent of married men sent money ‘home’ to the rural areas (Burrows 
& Scully et al., 1948: 145). Comparable data for Durban fifty years later (Smit, 
1998) found only half of an urban sample of 244 households to be strongly 
bonded to rural areas. Nineteen per cent of urban households had no rural links, 
and another 33 per cent were weakly linked (which is not to suggest that they 
were therefore self-contained: urban-urban links are under-researched but 
common, as numerous case studies reported in social anthropological papers 
make clear. Research on remittances has too long been trapped into a stereotype 
of a migrant male supporting a rural homestead). Posel (2001) and Flaherty 
(1995) have demonstrated the interpersonal nature of remittances in KwaZulu-
Natal.  Initial evidence, that the increased level of state benefits in the New 
South Africa was ‘crowding out’ ‘private transfers’ (Fox & Nel, 1998), has not 
been sustained by more recent analysis (May & Roberts 2001). 
 
The dependence of rural homesteads in KwaZulu-Natal in the nineties on 
support from migrant members was much lower than suggested by earlier 
studies in other places, presumably because many rural people live close enough 
to their place of work to commute daily. Analysing the PSLSD39 data collected 
in 1993, Posel (2001)  found only 35 per cent of 4,000 rural homesteads to have 
migrant workers, and only some 80 per cent of these to receive remittances from 
them – in effect only 28 per cent received money from migrants. Amongst these, 
the remittances accounted for (only) 57 per cent of homestead income. A not 
dissimilar picture is reported by Smit (1998) whose remittance data was limited 
to investment in building.  Thirty-two per cent of his sample contributed 
                                                          
39 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development. This first national South 
African household survey was made in 1993 under the auspices of the Southern African  
Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town, with 
financial and technical support from the World Bank. 
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regularly to the maintenance and construction of buildings in the rural 
homestead.  
 
It is worth noting how data of this kind would have depended on who was 
answering the questions, whether man or woman, old or young, married or 
unmarried. A young woman in the process of getting married would not claim 
attachment to her intended husband’s father’s rural homestead, but once married 
she would, especially if he was an heir. She might, on the other hand, retain and 
claim a link with her father’s rural homestead. She might contribute to buildings 
at her father’s home even though she intended to leave it permanently. Young 
men who had not yet built a house at their father’s homestead would claim to 
have no rural base, though they would in time acquire a share in one by this 
(traditionally expected) investment. Such building is an act of filial piety, not 
necessarily a statement of intention to return to live in the rural area. Urban 
identity coexists with rural links in complex ways, differently perceived by 
different informants. Leibbrandt (1989), revisiting an Eastern Cape rural area 
forty years after it had first been surveyed (by Houghton et al in 1947), found a 
decreased reliance on remittances from absent workers and decreased returns 
from crops, but increased returns from residents’ wages, and from stock. The 
apparent switch from migrants to commuters may reflect a growth in local 
employment opportunities, for apartheid encouraged (with tax incentives) the 
location of industry close to the bantustans as a strategy to make towns whiter. 
It may also be a matter of the official definition of ‘rural’: for apartheid 
simultaneously envisaged black residential areas, with little regard for density or 





Absentees are a commonplace of southern African social surveys. They are 
frequently listed alongside the other people found in a house (or household or 
family or homestead), but how exactly to define and identify them, and how to 
incorporate them into subsequent analysis, remains contentious. Once 
absenteeism is part of local practice, co-residence loses some of its power to 
signify domestic group boundaries, yet surveys remain residence-based, with 
absentees hopefully making up the acknowledged deficiency in the 
methodology. A moment’s thought will confirm that absentees are very 
differently conceived in rural and urban areas. Established patrilineal 
expectations shape the formal membership of a rural homestead and are likely to 
guide informants’ conceptions of who will be declared to be absent. Absent sons 
as co-heirs are de jure absentees, but not married daughters, even if they are 
contributors to their parents’ income. The status of absent unmarried daughters 
is less clear cut: destined for marriage elsewhere they may be (literally) written 
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off unless they are actively supporting other homestead members (often their 
own pre-marital children). No reciprocal expectations define urban household 
membership. A son living away and listed as absent from his rural homestead is 
very unlikely to consider any of his rural relations as absent from his urban 
household.  
 
This asymmetry has immediate implications for data collection. Data collected 
from rural areas will invariably be rich in absentees, and an easy source of 
information on inter-household dependencies. Palmer (1997), following 
Netting’s (1984) suggestion, recorded ‘intermittent co-residents’, characteristic 
of ‘peripheral parts of the world where labour migration is appreciable’, in two 
rural settlements in the eastern Cape. Intermittent co-residents are people who 
no longer live in the homestead but are linked to it by kinship or sentiment and 
express this through ‘correspondence, remittances and visits (Palmer, 1997: 12). 
He found each of the households sampled had ‘a smaller or greater “diaspora” 
temporarily or permanently absent’ (ibid.). In all, 42 per cent of the ‘total 
network’ of over three thousand people listed, were absent. A similar picture 
emerged from a sample of 60 households in KwaZulu Natal by Hosegood & 
Solarsh (2001), who found that 41 per cent of adults and 29 per cent of children 
listed were not living at the rural homestead. Subsequent analysis of a much 
larger population of some 85,000 people falling within the demographic 
surveillance system of the Africa Centre for Population Studies and 
Reproductive Health in KwaZulu Natal shows a much lower level of absentees: 
23 per cent, comprising 32 per cent of adults and 12 per cent of children 
(Hosegood & Timaeus, 2003: 16).  
 
The researchers at this centre have adopted an approach which whole-heartedly 
embraces the advice from a host of small-scale research projects, that in 
southern Africa co-residence is a poor indicator of social and economic 
interdependence. They have rejected co-residence as the criterion for household 
membership in favour of an so-called ‘emic’ approach, working through the 
community’s own definitions of domestic groups. Data is collected both by the 
landholding umuzi (or homestead) and by the more intimate family or household 
group, the umndeni, which they translate as ‘household’. They attempt to 
capture the ‘enormous population mobility and complex, varied social 
arrangements’ (Hosegood & Timaeus, 2003: 3) characteristic of KwaZulu-Natal 
by tracking changes in the composition of each umndeni and umuz in a series of 
exhaustive, four-monthly follow-up interviews. They have no hesitation in 
recording multiple memberships – for example of a child with unmarried 
parents, and thus membership of both parents’ homesteads – nor in recording as 
full members people who are living away – for example an absent working son 
of the head – provided they have returned home at least one night in the 
previous 12 months. This ambitious approach promises to ‘capture aspects of 
 59
household that have been documented by qualitative research in Southern Africa 
but missed by most other large-scale enquiries’ (op.cit.: 27). In their first 
analysis of this data, they find only 2.7 per cent of people have multiple 
household memberships. 
  
As Hosegood and Timaeus (2003:28) acknowledge, the term umndeni is no 
more fixed in its subjective meaning than the English terms family and 
household, for ‘no apparent consensus exists’ on the ‘important inclusion 
criteria’. However, their population pyramid of all umndeni/household members 
does suggest that some systematic exclusion is being exercised, for there is an 
unexpected shortfall of children under the age of 15. 
 
The nipped base of the pyramid reflects either a dramatic drop in the birth rate, 
or an exceptional emigration of children, or systematic under-reporting of some 
children. The first is improbable, though the political violence of the eighties 
may have impacted on reproduction as war classically does. Condom use may 
now be pushing down the birth-rate, but this would not have been true in 1985-
1990, as suggested by the pyramid (Aids-related deaths impact on a wider age 
range, especially the sexually active). The second explanation can be discounted 
by the research protocol which included absentees. We are left with the third 
possibility, the systematic under-reporting of some children.  
 
The strict operation of patrilineal principles in people’s perception of who 
composes the umndeni could have this consequence. Support for this 
interpretation comes from a table in which Hosegood and Timaeus list people 
who are actually living at the homestead but who have been excluded, by the 
informants’ own judgement, from umndeni membership. Who are these 
excluded affiliates? Half of them are clearly outsiders loosely attached to houses 
– domestic and agricultural helpers etc. But half of them are kin: they include 
children and grandchildren of the head of the umndeni. On what basis have they 
been excluded? Possibly lineage. Just such a pyramid would result if all the 
offspring of the head and his wife were to be listed, but not the children of 
married daughters, (nor, possibly, of some unmarried daughters) who, by 
patrilineal rules, belong to their fathers. Their table shows that close kinship, by 
itself, of some people actually residing with the umndeni, is insufficient to 
prevent their classification, by at least some purists, as non-members. 
 
Their research strategy works because it is grounded in the rural homestead. 
Physical location is the starting point. Each registered umdeni must have at least 
one member living at the homestead. An urban parallel is difficult to envisage 
because urban residence lacks all the formal continuity of the umuzi. Rural 




Data collected in urban areas is always much more sparse. Without probing, 
inter-household linkages and dependencies are likely to go unrecorded. But 
simple questions can quickly reveal the complexity of relationships in an 
apparently nuclear urban household, for example by establishing the identity and 
location of each parent of a listed ‘child’ in the household, and the children 
(with co-parent) of each listed adult. Absent parents, absent children, absent 
partners are the commonplace of black households.  
  
Absenteeism for reasons other than migration to work is less likely to be 
detected in standard urban surveys. Absent children are a case in point, 
discussed below. More perplexing are the criteria for deciding when and which 
absent adults deserve listing. How do you draw firm lines around permeable 
boundaries? Most surveys still look for a married couple as the lynchpin, and 
then turn to their offspring. Relatives falling outside this nuclear core are more 
likely to be omitted, especially if they are not physically present. An absent 
husband/father is most unlikely to be missed, but other absent contributors may 
well be.  
 
As confusing as the absentees are the visitors. Take for example a married 
daughter with clear commitments to another set of kin. She is very unlikely to be 
considered a member of her parents’ household unless she happens to be visiting 
the household at the time of the survey, when, as a daughter who has been 
sleeping in the house for the past however-many days, she suddenly very much 
resembles a household member. That such visiting is common, that people shunt 
between households, has long been observed in small-scale studies. 
Anthropological accounts are filled with case studies of people constantly on the 
move. Murray (1981) found the larger households in Lesotho to be in such a 
perpetual state of flux that it was difficult to identify de jure membership with 
any confidence. Webster (1987:14), grappling with the same problem in 
KwaZulu-Natal, was content to identify the bounded household as ‘an analytic 
convenience. I regard it as one part of a matrix of relationships with other 
households, with absent members in towns, on farms, on mines’.  
 
‘It is clear that households have an empirical reality, based partly on 
residential site, a cohabiting population of fluctuating size (due to 
migrant labour or inter-household flows of population), a tendency to 
work cooperatively and share food and services within the household 
(though this is by no means absolute) and, most importantly, the 
pooling of income and goods, often from a variety of sources, into a 
collective consumption fund’ (ibid).  
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The image is convincing, but offers the quantitative social scientist, anxious to 
grasp the bigger picture, little to go on. The economists Leibbrandt and 
Woolard, using the SALDRU 1993 data and the 1998 KIDS40 follow-up study to 
examine shifts in the economic fate of 1003 African households in KwaZulu-
Natal, found that eighty per cent of households had changed size within the five 
year period, half of them gaining or losing the equivalent of two adults or four 
children. Those who did both simultaneously, misleadingly swell the twenty per 
cent who appear ‘unchanged’. They comment, ‘the implications of this work are 
rather daunting for measurement at the household level because it seems clear 
that households themselves are endogenous and change and reshape in response 
to economic circumstances’ (Leibbrandt & Woolard, 2001: 688) 
 
But before we attribute too much to demographic mobility, we must consider 
how the research protocols may have affected the apparent composition of 
households. The data Leibbrandt and Woolard worked with included migrants as 
household members only if they slept at the household for four of the preceding 
seven nights. Under this rule, all long-distance migrants would have been 
excluded as household members, with only their remittances included as 
household income – unless of course it happened that such a migrant worker 
was encountered at home during the enumeration (or within three days of a four-
day – or longer – home visit). In this case s/he would have been included as a 
household member and consequently all of his/her earnings would have been 
included in the household income. Thus the chance visit of a migrant to his 
home at the moment of the survey interview can have the effect of doubling 
homestead cash income by his inclusion, or halving it by his exclusion should he 
be, as usual, at work. By the same logic, his random presence can have the effect 
of halving or doubling the number of female-headed households in the rural 
area. Research protocols shape data. Part of the apparent instability of the 
household membership (and its income, Leibbrandt and Woolard’s main 





The SALDRU 1993 sample of 8,800 households across South Africa (the basis 
of PSLSD) listed household members both present (de facto members) and 
absent (de jure members). Rules for inclusion were very generous: to qualify as 
a member, an absentee had to have lived in the household for at least 15 days of 
preceding year, as well as to have shared food from a common source when 
together, and contributed to or shared in a common resource pool. De facto 
                                                          
40 KIDS, The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamic Study, resurveyed in 1998 those households 
surveyed by PSLSD in 1993 which were in KwaZulu Natal. 
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members had to have been living in the household for at least 15 days of the 
preceding month (PSLSD, 1994: 34). Their de jure household comes close to the 
conception of household proposed by Wallerstein and colleagues described 
earlier – the flexible, stretched, divided group, not necessarily co-resident, not 
necessarily kin, who pool income over a life time (though ‘life-time’ raises new 
problems). Murray (1981), Webster (1988) and Spiegel (1995, 1996), have all 
urged the adoption of such a concept.  
 
But the ‘pool’ is not as useful as it sounds. It neatly accommodates the case of 
the single migrant labourer linked to some struggling rural base where his 
parents and wife are based, but it rapidly becomes very difficult to 
operationalise when obligations become more diverse. The idea of the pool, 
containing the shared resources of the range of people who will share over a 
lifetime, is too vague. Whose lifetime? How do we deal with a married woman’s 
continuing support (sometimes clandestine) to her own family of origin? How 
do we draw the line between one ‘household’ and another? When a migrant sets 
up with an urban partner is she too part of this stretched household? And since 
she supports her mother (from time to time) in some other rural homestead, are 
all three domestic units now fused on the grounds that some of their members 
support one another? Households may ‘pool’ some resources, but those who 
pool are not therefore a household. 
 
The concept of pooling also draws on the somewhat discredited idea of 
household as a centralised cooperative. It is in danger of making unfounded 
assumptions about the coherence of the household. Some indirect evidence of 
how rare pooling is amongst black co-residing urban households comes from 
Skordis and Welch (2002) who, comparing methods of collecting income data, 
found co-residing coloureds to have more accurate knowledge of one another’s 
income than black people had. An analysis of the way Swazi men in work spent 
their wages showed a spread of erratic responsibilities to people in several 
different households, some ‘traditional’ – to a wife, a father, a mother, a 
grandmother – others experienced as immediate personal pressures – to a current 
girlfriend, to a sister needing school fees, to an ex-girl friend with whom he had 
had a child (Russell, 1984). Wallerstein and Smith’s  neat geometry of adjacent 
life-time pools of shared resources bears little relationship to the untidy, 
overlapping, inter-locking, ever-changing networks of dependence and 
responsibility of contemporary South Africa. Redefining households as those 
who share, rather than those who live together presents unsolved major logistical 
problems, and leaves unresolved the issue of how we analyse the masses of 
information regularly gathered by the simple expedient of sampling addresses. 
The practical difficulty of applying Wallerstein’s concept of household is shown 
in Beittel’s (1992) essay, which tries to use his theoretical framework in a 
comparison of black and white households on the Witwatersrand over eighty 
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odd years. Working from secondary published sources, he is forced back on 
conventional definition of households as co-residential groups. 
 
  
The Compatibility of the Agnatic Form with 
Modern World 
 
The Western family historians identified individualism as a central factor in the 
establishment of the conjugal family, and attributed the emergence of 
individualism to the Reformation and the Renaissance. They depicted the 
extended family giving way to the conjugal family under the pressure of this 
individualism. Macfarlane, however, reverses the causal order, making the 
conjugal family a cause rather than a consequence of individualism. He 
explicitly attacks the dominant paradigm, arguing that new sources reveal 
English individualism as an ancient cultural trait, rooted in common law and 
private property, preceding, by several centuries, capitalism and industrialism. 
The Englishman’s individualism was ‘symbolised and shaped by his ego-centred 
kinship system’ (Macfarlane, 1978: 196). 
 
Goode’s (1970) thesis of the compatibility of the nuclear family with 
industrialisation appeared undisturbed but, in fact, a significant change had 
occurred: compatibility was a much weaker hypothesis. Other family systems 
could also be compatible with industrialisation. The debate about whether black 
South Africans are adopting the nuclear family system becomes much more 
interesting when seen in this light. The question is not the misguided one about 
how far industrialism, capitalism and urbanisation have pushed people along an 
evolutionary path to a conjugal system, but what choices people are making, 
given that they now live in a society in which ‘money, profit, contract, mobility, 
individualism and competition have all asserted themselves. How attractive and 
accessible is the conjugal pattern? How robust is the agnatic idiom to meet 
contemporary wants and needs? 
 
The conjugal nuclear family household has been widely misunderstood as a 
response to capitalist industrial economy. This misunderstanding has been 
accompanied by an expectation that, wherever capitalism reaches, the conjugal 
family will eventually follow. This expectation is wrong on at least two counts. 
First (following Laslett (1965, 1972), Wall (1972), McFarlane (1978, 1986)), the 
conjugal nuclear household preceded rather than followed capitalism. Second 
(following Wallerstein and Smith (1992), Martin and Beittel (1987), Arrighi 
(1979)), in an international division of labour there are no grounds for expecting 
capitalism to shape uniform households throughout the world. To the contrary, 
people on the periphery are destined (by definition) to participate in the world 
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economy in a different way from people at the core, and to construct their 
households accordingly. 
 
Black people in southern Africa were drawn into the world economy with a set 
of domestic practices shaped by very different economic circumstances, and 
legitimated by a conception of kinship (hence responsibility) very different from 
that in the West. This agnatic system is proving no less resilient at adapting to 
the demands of the international economy than the conjugal system. The notion 
that the Western nuclear family, with its limited size and restricted compass, is 
the ideal flexible unit for capitalism looks suspiciously ethnocentric when 
measured against the ease with which the agnatic system has been able to 
deliver highly mobile, single workers to the system – with no talk of a ‘family 
wage’.41 The subsequent erosion of African landholdings has changed the basis 
of this individual independence (there is no longer a kraal full of goats and 
cows, nor a field of maize and beans behind each worker), but not the culture of 
individual self-sufficiency which has emerged from an economy in which 
everyone (particularly women and children) made a significant contribution.  
 
Single mothers stream onto the labour market confident that their children are 
safe, for in matters of child-rearing South African black society entertains a 
wider range of kin as carers than the West. Premarital pregnancies – a 
concomitant of traditionally protracted marriages – take place within an already-
established household, that of the girl’s mother. If not already comprised of an 
ideal child-rearing group (those too old or too young for wage-employment), 
such kin can usually be called in. A major practical constraint against premarital 
pregnancies in the West – the absence of a viable household in which a child can 
be raised – falls away. Receptive households already exist in Africa. The West 
instead delegates a major share of child care to non-kin. All parents in Britain 
routinely have their parental rights curtailed when their children reach school-
age at five. This practice of non-kin child-rearing was imposed 125 years ago in 
Britain, and has been one of the West’s most conscientious exports to other 
cultures ever since. The United Nations now routinely measures deprivation as – 
inter alia – the proportion of children being brought up by their own kin. That 
compulsory schooling by professionally trained outsiders is necessarily the 
better policy is seldom questioned. 
  
‘Household’ in the Western conjugal system is narrowly prescribed. No such 
prescription limits co-residential patterns amongst black South Africans. May & 
Roberts (2001, 109) cite ‘preliminary evidence’ from panel studies of large data 
sets in KwaZulu Natal that ‘both poor and non-poor households may manipulate 
household composition and structure as a coping strategy at times of economic 
                                                          
41 Even Marx assumed women’s place was in the kitchen. 
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duress’. Households can reform in a number of ways at short notice in response 
to economic (or other) contingencies because of the kinship system. The formal 
multiplication of key statuses – fathers rather than father, mothers rather than 
mother – has real consequences. By contrast, the Western household 
composition is fixed within extremely narrow kinship limits. The African 
kinship system itself allows, even encourages, absenteeism. The flexibility of 
residence patterns amongst African children is strikingly at odds with Western 
expectations. 
 
Although the household is a contingent social arrangement, such an arrangement 
can become institutionalised when a group of people face the same recurrent 
problems. The faster the pace of change, the less likely that household structures 
will be standardised. The tension in South Africa over tradition reflects the pace 
of transformation. Black family breakdown is a common theme of contemporary 
commentators. Murray (1981) reports a high rate of marital failure in Lesotho, 
and a breakdown of broader patterns of obligation between kin, as do Sharp and 
Spiegel (1985). Ross (1995) makes similar observations. Malao (1994:14) writes 
of the ‘moral disintegration and social fragmentation’ of the African family, and 
lists amongst its pathologies rape, infanticide, incest, adultery and child-
mutilation.  
 
A social transition is underway, but its nature is seriously misrepresented as a 
transition to a nuclear system. As suggested elsewhere (Russell, 2002), it is 
more helpful to see contemporary economic pressures modifying both the 
Western nuclear and the African agnatic systems in the same direction: greater 
individualisation, less long-term commitment, higher expectations of self-
fulfilment and self-indulgence. The urban environment – the creation, in South 
Africa, of industrial capitalist entrepreneurship – allows and encourages this 
self-centredness. A barrage of advertising and a manipulated pop culture 
legitimate it. The new political culture of human rights, generously supported by 
capital, slyly underpins it. Urban black people are evenly divided over 
appropriate domestic behaviour. On the one hand, some adhere to the older 
standards, which are still upheld with remarkable consistency in rural areas; on 
the other, some espouse the newer ideas which impatiently reject such notions as 
personal responsibility for elderly parents, extended family household living, 
priority to in-laws, and post-parturition sexual abstinence (Russell, 2002: 53). 
Writing of Africa in general, Lesthaeghe, Kaufmann & Meekers (1989:241) 
acknowledge the ‘weakening of lineage control’ as a result of ‘integration into 
the capitalist economy’, but state ‘at this juncture it is difficult to imagine 




The implications for social scientists making household surveys are clear and 
dire. The assumption that those who at some surveyed moment are found living 
together constitute a persisting bounded interdependent unit, while valid for 
other parts of the world where conjugal kinship systems prevail, cannot be made 
in contemporary South Africa. Implicit recognition of this fact in the South 
African practice of listing absentees, is inadequate, for it makes similar Western 
assumptions about where people ‘really’ belong. All data on the distribution of 
household incomes, especially that which compares rural with urban, must be 
received with scepticism. New research protocols are urgently required, 
hopefully devised by imaginative native social scientists able to challenge 
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